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ABSTRACT
This paper provides empirical evidence on two mechanisms through which a commit-
ted investment in human capital serves as a stepping stone into permanent employ-
ment. I verify whether regional disparities in general education and production sys-
tems affect the capacity of the apprenticeship labour contract to create job matches
that persist over time. I find that when the quality of the regional education system
is good, the medium-run gains in terms of permanent employment can be moderate.
However, a small number of productive firms in a region limits the quantity of job
entries as apprentices.
KEYWORDS
Human capital; permanent employment; education system; production system
JEL CLASSIFICATION
J24, J21, I20, D2
1. Introduction
In recent years, technological innovations and the globalisation process have posed a
challenge to the labour market to create not only jobs but good jobs. One expects
that a commitment to invest in human capital can contribute to the creation of a
good quality job and the consequent permanent employment position. If this is the
case, apprenticeships have an advantage over the other labour contracts to lead to
permanent employment (Maida & Sonedda, 2019). Why are not apprenticeships more
widespread? The answer is because there exist influential factors that restrict their
use.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of the general education and pro-
duction systems in shaping which labour contract serves as a stepping stone into
permanent employment. I exploit the Italian regional disparities in these systems to
shed light on this issue. Looking at the regional disparities is important to fill some
gaps in the literature. The presence of a legally enforceable commitment of the firms to
training provision explains why firm-based vocational training schemes work in some
countries but not in others (Dustmann & Scho¨nberg, 2012). However, this nation-
wide institutional setting is a necessary but not sufficient condition to influence the
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willingness of firms to provide training. For instance, on the basis of this argument
only, it would be hard to justify the existence of differences within and across indus-
tries. These differences are analysed by Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2009) who focus
on the role of the degree of unionisation. The argument that unions serve as commit-
ment and as wage floor device is convincing. Nevertheless, further explanations are
still missing. Otherwise, in countries like Switzerland and Germany where the appren-
ticeship labour contract works, regional differences are only due to differences in the
degree of unionisation (or in the degree of the enforceable commitment of the firms to
training provision).
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting new empirical evidence that
points to the importance of two influencing factors: the general education and pro-
duction systems. Regional disparities in these systems contribute to explain not only
regional differences in the apprenticeship rate but also the extent to which appren-
ticeships serve as a stepping stone into permanent employment. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper that tackles this empirical issue.
I use a very rich administrative dataset, by the Italian Ministry of Labour and
Social Policies, CICO (the so-called Comunicazioni Obbligatorie). Focusing on Italy
is interesting for three reasons. First, law no. 247/2007, Legislative Decree no.167/2011
and law no.92/2012 introduced a common nationwide institutional setting that fixed
the rules governing the apprenticeship labour contract and increased the commitment
to training and general education provision. Second, in Italy, wage floor applies erga
omnes and not only to unionised firms. Third, Italy is characterised by a further
dualism within a dual labour market1: the North-South divide which is possibly related
to regional disparities that interact with the functioning of the labour market.
I assume that the data generating process of the permanent employment rate is re-
lated to the legal rule that in Italy a job entry as apprentice is only available, albeit not
mandatory, up to 29 years and 364 days of age.2 This yields to a discontinuity in the
permanent employment rate around the cutoff of 30 years of age. This discontinuity
in the permanent employment rate can depend on the apprenticeship labour contract
only. There is no reason to observe such data generating process of permanent em-
ployment in case of transitions from either unemployment or from a temporary labour
contract. On the top of that, I expect that the introduction of law no. 92/2012 has
exogenously changed this data generating process. If fact, the law explicitly aimed at
encouraging apprenticeships as the main port of entry into permanent employment. A
mentoring scheme was introduced to strengthen the vocational training component of
the job. This rule was complemented by a future punishment to the firm that avoided
to maintain on a permanent basis at least 30% of those hired as apprentices three
years before. This setting allows me to design a difference in discontinuity regression
model. That is, the difference in the discontinuity around the cutoff of 30 years of age,
generated by the labour market reform, creates a source of randomised variation. Since
this variation is randomised, it is independent of any observable factor that can be
added as a covariate in the regression model, including the indicator of the location of
work. I expect that the permanent employment probability of cohorts treated by the
labour market reform, around the age cutoff, has increased compared to the permanent
employment probabilities of similar untreated individuals (Maida & Sonedda, 2019).
1According to the original definition of Doeringer and Piore (1971), labour markets are dual in nature if they
are segregated into primary and secondary spheres.
2This implies that I am considering apprenticeships as a labour contract committed to the provision of on
the job training and of general education courses outside the firm. The role of apprenticeships as part of the
vocational education and training system, alternative to a more academic education track, is here neglected.
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This paper adds to the literature the analysis of regional disparities in this difference
in discontinuity impact. The aim is twofold. First, by estimating whether there are
regional differences, it contributes to illustrate how the regional labour markets evolve.
Second, from a more general perspective, it provides empirical evidence that reveals
which mechanisms allow an investment in human capital to create job matches that
persist over time.
This paper verifies whether regional permanent employment patterns are related to
the regional production and general education systems. This analysis differs from the
few existing studies using data at regional level, e.g. Brunello and De Paola (2008);
Muehlemann and Wolter (2008), in four crucial aspects. First, exploiting a randomised
variation, this paper overcomes one of the major problem that has to be faced when
analysing regional differences in labour market outcomes: the region of work is not
exogenous. Employers can decide where to locate their economic activity. Employees
can migrate if there are not good employment opportunities in the region where they
were born. Second, the main outcome is the individual’s permanent employment prob-
ability and how it is related to the apprenticeship probability rather than the training
decision of the firm. Third, I analyse the role of the quality of the regional education
and production systems in determining the size of these difference in discontinuity
impacts at the baseline and in the medium-run. For instance, it could be the case
that it is not the number of firms or the number of employees per squared kilome-
ter that matter per se´. If there are complementarities between former education and
the on-the-job human capital investment, a qualitative, rather than a quantitative,
measure of general education better contributes to determine the number of potential
apprentices. This qualitative measure(s) corresponds to the percentage of individuals
who scored the minimum (maximum) level in the Programme for International Stu-
dent Assessment (PISA) tests in math and reading performance. By the same token,
the limited number of productive firms in a region3 could serve as a barrier to the
quantity of successful apprenticeship labour contracts. In fact, for both employer and
employees, the apprenticeship contract implies a costly investment whose future return
is uncertain. It is, therefore, likely that only firms with medium-long terms production
opportunities invest on it. Last but not least, there is no paper that verify whether
there are regional disparities in the medium-run effect on permanent employment of
the initial human capital investment. By looking at the dynamics, the paper provides
an important evidence on the main argument of the paper. The combination of a com-
mitted human capital investment in a open-ended contract (as apprenticeships) drives
the screening-sorting processes that lead to permanent employment, on the top of hu-
man capital accumulation. If this is true, the probability that this job match persists
over time is higher than the same probability of other job matches created without the
same commitment to the human capital investment (Maida & Sonedda, 2019). This
holds more true if there are complementarities between the former education and the
on-the-job human capital investment.
I find that the capacity of the apprenticeship labour contract to serve as a stepping
stone into permanent employment is limited when the quality of the education system
is low and the number of productive firms is small. Different results emerge when
instead the quality of the education system is high. In such a case, the medium-run
gains in terms of permanent employment are moderate. This is possibly revealing the
existence of complementarities between former education and further human capital
3Of course, it is likely that the limited number of firms and the limited number of productive firms are
correlated.
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accumulation. These medium-run gains come out even in absence of any impact at the
baseline.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the setting. Section
3 illustrates the identification strategy while section 4 describes the data. Results are
reported in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. The setting
2.1. Related literature
The article is related to at least three strands of the literature.
First, the effect of dualism on labour markets has been widely analysed, see for
instance Dolado (2017). From every angle this issue is looked at, in a dual labour
market employers are more reluctant to hire workers on a permanent basis. This lit-
erature focuses on the role of the employment protection legislation and reaches no
clear consensus on which kind of labour contract can be used as the main port of
entry into stable, high quality, employment. On the one hand, it is generally assumed
that temporary contract do not bear the firing costs which have to be paid to ter-
minate permanent contracts. This assumption, implies that employers might prefer
temporary to permanent jobs. The former contracts, by decreasing firing costs, could,
theoretically, be useful to young inexperienced workers to raise their job experience
easing their transition towards permanent employment. After a period of screening,
the firm could convert these contracts, letting them be stepping stones into permanent
employment (Booth, Francesconi, & Frank, 2002; Heinrich, Mueser, & Troske, 2005;
Holmlund & Storrie, 2002; Ichino, Mealli, & Nannicini, 2008). However, as suggested
by Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet (2016), in all countries, open-ended jobs comprise
probationary periods and temporary works cannot be terminated before their ending
date. As a result, firms profitably screen temporary workers only if the duration of the
probationary period is shorter than that of fixed term contracts. The authors consider
a job search and matching model where the use of temporary contracts hinges on the
heterogeneity of expected production opportunities. Short-term (even very short ones)
contracts can emerge in equilibrium because they are used for production opportuni-
ties with short expected durations. Workers could, therefore, end up moving from one
temporary contract to another letting these contracts be dead-end jobs (Blanchard
& Landier, 2002; Boeri & Garibaldi, 2007; Cahuc & Postel-Vinay, 2002). Moreover,
as the expected duration of fixed term contracts gets shorter, firms are less likely to
invest in workers training because the return of this investment in human capital is
low, if positive. Besides, fixed-terms workers are more likely to lose their incentives to
exert more effort to accumulate better productive capabilities. As a result, the suc-
cessfulness of temporary labour contracts to help employers to screen workers’ ability
and employees to sort in better jobs could be limited.
Second, I complement the literature on the determinants of firm sponsored train-
ing. I present new empirical evidence on the factors that could make an investment in
human capital be a device to optimise the screening-sorting processes that lead to per-
manent employment. To this extent, the apprenticeship labour contract can have an
advantage over the other labour contracts.4 Apprenticeship training allows individuals
to accumulate human capital which translates into ex-post higher productivity. The in-
formational content of the contract is crucial here. In fact, informational asymmetries
4In Italy since 2008 apprenticeship contracts are considered permanent labour contracts.
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convert general into specific training since the current employer has an informational
advantage on his employees’ productivity relative to other firms (Acemoglu & Pischke,
1998, 1999). Both firms (in terms of monopsony rents) and individuals (in terms of
higher wages and higher probability of permanent employment) benefit of the higher
worker’s productivity. Firms and workers share also the cost of this human capital in-
vestment. Firms are required, during time of work, to let apprentices attend external
courses provided by local authorities or accredited training institutes sponsored by
the regions. In fact, these external courses depend on the regional public funding and
infrastructures. Firms are partly compensated for the training costs by a tax rebate.
From the workers’ perspective the apprenticeship labour contract is costly because it
requires costly effort and it implies a lower initial wage. To some extent, the lower
initial wage eliminates the wage rigidity which prevents an offsetting transfer from
workers to firms in exchange for being insured against job losses (E. P. Lazear, 1990).
In fact, there are some analogies with a contract that fix a performance related pay
component of (future) earnings. The costs of the vocational training and the gen-
eral education provided by the contract and the lower initial wage are compensated
by a permanent labour contract and higher earnings in the future. The rationale is
here similar to Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castrillo, and Porteiro (2014) who argue that
long-term contracts allow the better provision of incentives because firms can credibly
transfer payments from earlier to later periods in the life of the workers. The higher
the worker effort is, the higher the probability of a long-lasting employment relation-
ship, the higher future earnings will be. On the top of that, it is the combination
of a costly human capital investment in a open-ended contract that could allow bet-
ter sorting-screening processes. However, there might be further explanations on the
successfulness of the apprenticeship labour contract over and above the informational
content. In absence of these further mechanisms it would be difficult to explain differ-
ences across countries. In fact, information asymmetries and skill specificities are not
likely to vary greatly across countries while institutional attributes do. An important
contribution in this direction is provided by Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2012) who
relate the successfulness of apprenticeships to the commitment to training provision
guaranteed by the countries’ institutional framework. While the authors focus on a
mechanism which clearly explains why apprenticeship performs better in a country
rather than another, it does not completely address the issue of why there might be
differences across regions, sectors and occupations within a country. A potential expla-
nation of the existence of within and across industries differences relies on Dustmann
and Scho¨nberg (2009) who account for such differences in terms of the degree of union-
isation. In fact, unions set a wage floor, which is another influencing factor of the firm
decision to provide training. From the employees’ perspective, unionised firms offer a
long-term wage contract. In the future, at least the union wage has to be paid. From
the employer’s point of view, the unions’ wage floor determines wage compression.
As long as the equilibrium wage structure is more compressed than the productivity
differentials, the firm makes greater profits from more skilled workers. Consequently, if
the training costs are not too large, it is profitable for the employer to invest in the em-
ployee’s human capital (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998, 1999). Dustmann and Scho¨nberg
(2009) provide empirical evidence that apprenticeship training is higher in unionised
firms in Germany.
Third, very few papers present empirical evidence on the firm decision to provide
training using data at regional level. Brunello and De Paola (2008) study the rela-
tionship between local labour market density and firm sponsored training. The local
labour market density is measured by the number of employees per squared kilometer
5
in a province. The authors show that, theoretically, the effect of economic density on
the firm decision to train cannot be signed. On the one hand, a higher density of the
local labour market increases productivity and consequently encourages firms to in-
vest more in training. On the other hand, a higher density of the local labour market
reduces the rents of the firms and consequently lowers the incentive to train. They use
data on more than 1000 Italian manufacturing firms, drawn from the Survey of Italian
Manufacturing by Mediocredito Centrale, to present estimates on such relationship.
They find that the local agglomeration pattern has a negative and statistically dif-
ferent from zero impact on the willingness of the firms to invest in the employees’
human capital. Muehlemann and Wolter (2008) use a representative firm level data
set to estimate whether the local industry structure and education system affects the
decision of the firm to hire apprentices in Switzerland. The local industry structure
is proxied by the number of competing firms situated in the same geographical area.
In the attempt to avoid endogeneity issues related to the geographical location of the
firm, the authors define the geographical area in terms of travel distances rather than
political borders. The local education system is measured in three different ways: by
the local number of young people of school-leaving age; by the local share of pupils
of foreign nationality and by the local share of young people completing compulsory
education that opted for grammar schools in 1995. They find that while the num-
ber of competing firms situated in the same geographical area affects negatively the
probability of apprenticeship training, the number of young people of school-leaving
age in the area has instead a positive impact on it. All in all, regional disparities in
the education and production systems are particularly relevant to understanding to
what extent a labour contract committed to a costly human capital investment, serves
as a stepping stone into permanent employment. Drawing on the North-South divide
in Italy, I study the heterogeneity across Italian regions of the impact of the labour
market reform (law no. 92/2012) at the threshold of 30 years of age, above which job
entries as apprentices is not possible. In what follows, I will briefly describe the Italian
institutional framework.
2.2. Institutional framework
Constitutional law n. 3 of 18 October 2001 brought substantial amendments to Title V
of the Italian Constitution. It enhanced the powers of the Regional Governments and
institutionalised the principle of the autonomy of the educational institutions. Educa-
tion is included among the matters of concurrent legislation between the State and the
regions. The State is exclusively responsible for general norms and sets fundamental
principles. In fact, the State determines the general educational goals and it reviews
the performance by evaluating whether the results obtained in the school system meet
the requested standards. The State is also in charge for allocating financial and hu-
man resources to the educational institutions. The regions are responsible for building
activities, educational assistance, programming how to integrate the vocational train-
ing and the school systems.5 As a result, exclusive power to legislate over vocational
training is given to the regions.
law no 30/2003 and legislative decree no. 276/2003 reformed the rules governing
the apprenticeship contracts. The traditional contract (apprenticeship for vocational
qualifications and diplomas, upper secondary education diplomas and high techni-
5Merger and closure of schools and the organization of the school systems, including the use of buildings and
materials, are instead competencies assigned to local governments.
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cal specialisation certificates), that can be assimilated to a vocational and education
training programme, was complemented by a new form of apprenticeship, vocational
apprenticeship.6 For this new type of apprenticeship, the age limit, above which the
contract cannot be signed7, was extended from 24 years and 364 days to 29 years and
364 days. Cappellari, Dell’Aringa, and Leonardi (2012) exploit the variability across
regions and across sectors to show that this apprenticeship reform had an overall pro-
ductivity enhancing effect. In fact, to accomplish with these new normative require-
ments, regional governments had to issue regional regulations. Although, in general,
regions were slow in fulfilling this task, some regions implemented the legislation ear-
lier than others. (Autonomous Province of Bolzano in Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia
Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Marche, Puglia, Sardegna, Toscana). Besides, there
was a certain degree of heterogeneity in the contents of these regional regulations.
As a consequence, law no. 247/2007 started the process, culminated with legislative
decree no. 167/2011, of establishing a common regulation across all regions. Based on
these premises, law no. 92/2012 reformed further the apprenticeship labour contract.
Three aspects of the law are relevant. Two of them are expected to have a direct and
intended impact on the probability of apprenticeship. First, the law enforced a men-
toring scheme that might have increased the worker’s productivity. Second, the law
introduced a punishment on the firms which do not accomplish with the commitment
of employing permanently the apprentice (with the exception of motivated lay-offs).
In fact, these firms cannot hire more than one apprentice in future. This punishment
increases the worker’s value of apprenticeship and discourage the production-oriented,
in favour of the investment-oriented, usage of the apprenticeship contract. Third, the
law increased the social security contributions burdened on temporary contracts while
keeping fixed the tax rebate on the apprenticeship contracts.
Given this institutional framework, I focus on the quality of the regional general
education system and on the number of productive firms in a region as influencing
factors in the creation of a permanent job position through the apprenticeship labour
contract. These regional determinants play a role over and above differences in the
quality of regional external training courses which were not affected by the labour
market reform.
3. Identification strategy
Following Maida and Sonedda (2019), I start by assuming that the data generating
process of the apprenticeship rate is based on the legal rule that, in Italy, job entry
as apprentice is only available, albeit not mandatory, up to 29 years and 364 days of
age. This yields to a deterministic process of the apprenticeship rate on one side of
the cutoff of 30 years. As a consequence the data generating process of permanent
employment rate exhibits a discontinuity around this age threshold. On the top of
that, I expect that the introduction of law no. 92/2012 has exogenously changed this
data generating process. This setting allows me to design the following difference in
discontinuity regression model:8
6The reform introduced also a third type, the higher education and research apprenticeship.
7The minimum length of the apprenticeship contract is six months. This implies that there are individuals
aged more than age limit working as apprentices. That is, the rule sets the age limit to job entries as apprentices.
The maximum length of the contract is three years, although there could be some exceptions.
8The preliminary analysis discussed in Section 4 shows that a local linear model specification fits the data. In
the on-line Appendix I will show how to derive this model specification using the potential outcomes framework,
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yi,t = α0 + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + i,t (1)
where yi,t is the outcome for individual i at time (year, month) t; ait is the forcing
variable age parameterised as deviation from 30; kit is an indicator function which
takes the value of 1 if the individual, given her age and year of birth, is treated by law
no. 92/2012 and dit is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the person is
aged less than 30 years.9
In what follows, I will consider as outcomes y: the employment probability, the
permanent employment probability and the apprenticeship probability.
The difference in the discontinuity around the cutoff of 30 years of age, generated
by the labour market reform, creates a source of randomised variation. In fact, since
the forcing variable, age, is observed, there is little room for discretion from an iden-
tification standpoint. The only choice is to estimate the expectation of the outcome,
y, conditional on the forcing variable, age, on either side of the cutoff before and after
the introduction of law no. 92/2012. The interpretation of the Intention To Treat,
ITT , parameter, γ1, simplifies to measuring to what extent, around the age threshold,
the outcome of interest changes for individuals treated by law no. 92/2012 compared
to similar individuals born in contiguous cohorts, who reached the threshold age be-
fore the introduction of the law. This differential impact is compared across similar
individuals, who differ because of their age, in the possibility to enter into a job as
apprentice and who differ because of their year of birth which assigns them to the
treatment of law no 92/2012. This is very appealing for two reasons. First, it allows to
avoid to take strong stance about which covariates to include in the analysis. In fact,
the design predicts that the observable covariates are irrelevant and unnecessary for
identification. Second, within the design all the relevant factors are controlled for and
the crucial assumption that no omitted variables are correlated with the treatment is
trivially satisfied. When the individual’s age is lower (higher) than 30 the intention to
treatment dummy, d, is always equal to 1 (0). Conditional on age, there is no variation
left in the assignment into intention to treat. It cannot, therefore, be correlated with
any other factor. This implies a conditional independence assumption with respect to
the individual’s region of work (and birth) and generates a suitable environment to
estimate whether regional disparities in the apprenticeship probability exist and to
what extent these differentials translate into regional disparities in permanent labour
contracts.
Regression model 1 is, therefore, augmented to allow for heterogenous effects across
regions:
yi,t = α1r + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + β1raitrit + γ1rditkitrit + rit + i,t (2)
where rit are the regional dummies which corresponds to the individual’s region of
work.
The parameter γ1r measures the static and instantaneous at the baseline ITT ef-
fect which is specific to each region. I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting. The
(Maida & Sonedda, 2019)
9Equation 1 refers to the general linear model specification. However, since the analysis is restricted to the
range of ±1 year of age around the cutoff, it is not possible to include both the forcing variable (parameterised
as deviation from 30) and the indicator function for being under (above) the age threshold.
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following regression model takes into account the persistency in outcome generated by
the exogenous shock of the reform at the age threshold10 and allows to retrieve the
dynamic ITT parameter:
yi,t = α1r + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + β1raitrit + γ1rditkitrit + (3)
+φτ (
τ˜∑
τ=1
(α1ki,t−τ + β0ai,t−τ + γTOTτ di,t−τki,t−τ + γ0di,t−τ ) +
+φτ (
τ˜∑
τ=1
(γTOTτ di,t−τki,t−τri,t−τ ) + i,t
The above model specification allows for estimating whether the difference in dis-
continuity impact is heterogenous across Italian regions. However, it does not help
clarifying why these differential effects might occur. I attempt at shedding light on the
mechanisms which could generate regional disparities in outcomes. I start by investi-
gate whether the impact on the labour outcomes is different for those who were born
in the same region where they work compared to the effect on those who migrate. The
static regression model is the following:
yi,t = α1r + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + β1raitrit + γ1rditkitrit + rit + (4)
+β1raitritlit + γ1rditkitritlit + lit + i,t
where lit is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if the individual is born
in the same region where she works.11
I, then, decompose further the effect for those who migrate distinguishing between
neighbouring and non-neighbouring regions. The aim is to verify whether similar indi-
viduals born in a region rather than another have an advantage in their labour market
performances. Still, this evidence clarifies whether there is heterogeneity across Ital-
ian regions but it does not explain why. To achieve this goal, I focus on two possible
explanations.
First, I consider the role of the characteristics of the production system. The static
model described by equation 1 is modified to grant for heterogenous effects which
rely on the number of productive firms in a region and on the variance of firms’ total
revenues in a region:
yi,t = α1r + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + vit + β1raitvit + γ1rditkitvit + i,t (5)
where vit are the dummies for the quartiles of the distribution of the regional number
of firms with a non-missing record in total revenues or the dummies for the quartile of
the distribution of the regional variance in total revenues. That is to say, for instance,
10That is to say that I expect that if job entry as apprentice serves as stepping stone into permanent employ-
ment, in the months following the baseline, the current permanent employment position depends also on the
permanent employment position at the baseline which in turn is related to the impact of the labour market
reform around the age cutoff.
11To provide a comprehensive view of the issue, I consider also the dynamic version of equation 4 which
amounts to equation 3 augmented by the dummy lit.
9
that the dummy for the second quartile takes the value of 1 if a certain region sits in
the second quartile of the distribution of the regional number of productive firms.
Second, I analyse the role of the quality of the regional education system. By the
same token, the variable vit refers to the quartiles of the distribution of the regional
percentage of those who scored the minimum (maximum) level in the PISA test in
math and reading performance.
4. Data
4.1. Description of the data
Data are taken from a very rich administrative dataset by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Policies, CICO (the so-called Comunicazioni Obbligatorie). In a given year, for
each cohort of birth, the dataset gathers all individuals who are born on the 1st, the
9th, the 10th and the 11th of each month. It includes, since 2009, detailed information
on the flow of all job contracts, activated, transformed and dismissed, for dependent
and independent (individuals with VAT number) workers for all sectors including the
Agricultural sector and the Public Administration. The relevant dates (day, month,
year) of each event are available in the database together with the type of labour
contract, the sector, the region of work and an anonymous identifier for both the firm
and the worker and the type of benefit associated to the contract, if granted. For
each worker, I have information on the gender, the year of birth, the region of birth,
citizenship and education.
The working sample is centered in a±30 months interval around June 2012 when law
no. 92 was issued. This implies that those treated (untreated) by the reform are those
who reach a given age between July 2012 to December 2014 (January 2010 to June
2012) ending up with two and half affected and unaffected cohorts. Since there is not
precise information on the date of birth of the individual, to minimize measurement
error in the definition of age, the latter is measured at the 31st December of the
previous year. That is to say, for example, that in 2012 an individual is aged 29 with
certainty if she is born in 1982 and she is turning to 30 in an unknown month during
that year.
Using the information on the region of work, the database is merged with Bureau
Van Dijk (AIDA) data and with data on regional human capital indicators provided by
the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT).12 Aida contains comprehensive information on
all Italian companies required to file their accounts, approximately 1 million companies.
I consider companies with a non-missing value on revenues amounting to 919, 456
(2010), 939, 488 (2011), 937, 170 (2012), 940, 106 (2013) and 947, 449 (2014) firms.
I start from restricting the age interval of ±5 years around the age threshold. After
this selection the sample includes 39, 216, 787 observations involving 1,015,069 workers
and 693,662 firms. In the same age range, considering only those who started either
a job spell or a self-employment activity13 in a given year, the sample is made of
11,874,149 observations involving 649,525 individuals and 500,514 firms. The prelimi-
nary analysis will show that the local linear regression model fits well the data in the
age range of ±1 year around the cutoff. The working sample, therefore, amounts to
2, 132, 899 observations gathering 168,542 individuals and 152,225 firms.
12ISTAT data are taken from the web site http://dati-capumano.istat.it/?lang=en
13I have information on self-employment activities by merging CICO data with two datasets recording self-
employment and independent jobs episodes in the professional orders.
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4.2. Preliminary analysis
In what follows I present suggestive evidence on the absence of strong compositional
change of the working sample before and after the labour market reform.
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Figure 1. Regional distribution of the number of individuals in the working sample.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts for each region of work the share of the number of
individuals in the working sample over the residential population at a given age.14
This quota could differ across regions for three reasons. First, because labour market
participation is quite heterogeneous. Second, because the age profile in the access to
the labour market is not homogenous.15 Third, if the migration process is not similar.
The ratio is higher than 1 in Trentino Alto Adige suggesting that there are workers
inflows. It is instead quite low in Campania where there might be outflows of workers.
Panel (b) of the Figure considers the migration process from another perspective. It
illustrates the region where foreign workers migrate. Foreign workers migrate most to
northern and central regions. This is expected since it is a well known stylised fact
that the labour market is more dynamic in the northern and central part of Italy. All
in all, the Figure shows that pre- and post-reform cohorts are quite balanced out.
Figure B1, reported in the on-line Appendix B1, gives a sense of the importance
of the phenomenon of migration of Italian workers across national regions. It displays
the regional distribution of workers by region of birth. In all regions, the highest
frequency is associated to those working in the same region where they were born.
Southern born individuals migrate to the centre-north of Italy while those born in the
northern and central regions migrate towards the neighbouring regions. As expected,
migration is a larger phenomenon for those born in the South. It is confirmed that
pre- and post-reform cohorts are balanced out. This is reassuring and it suggests that
the migration process is independent from the labour market reform around the age
cutoff. Compared to other empirical strategies, the difference in discontinuity design
fits better to pursue the main objective of the paper. I carry out two preliminary tests
to validate the empirical model. These tests are reported in the on-line Appendix A1.
First, when implementing the difference in discontinuity design, this study relies on
age based cutoff. Following Lee and Card (2008) I use parametric regression to estimate
14Data on the residential population are ISTAT census data.
15CICO data are representative of the universe of job flows but they do not account for the stock of job
episodes. This implies that I cannot observe those who have permanently (without losing the job) entered in
the labour market before 2009.
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the conditional expectations of the outcome variable (the apprenticeship probability,
the employment probability and the permanent employment probability) at the cutoff
point comparing treated and untreated cohorts by extrapolation. The discreteness
of the assignment variable provides a natural way of testing whether the regression
model is well specified by comparing the fitted model to the raw dispersion in mean
outcomes at each value of the assignment variable. As suggested by Lee and Card
(2008) I present a goodness of fit statistics which tests whether the restricted model
(e.g. local linear regressions or polynomial regressions) is statistically identical to the
unrestricted model where a full set of dummies (one for each value of the assignment
variable, age) is included. Standard errors are clustered by age and year of birth. The
lower the value of the test than the critical value, the higher the confidence on the
validity of the estimated effect. All the tables, illustrated in the on-line Appendix A1,
clearly show that for each region and for each outcome of interest a (local) linear
model specification is always supported by the data when the sample is restricted to
an age range ±1 year around the threshold. There is not, instead, an homogeneous
data generating process across regions and within region across outcomes when the age
range is enlarged. In fact, a second (third or fourth or even higher) order polynomial
in age is necessary when the sample is extended to the age range ±2(3) years around
the cutoff.
Second, I examine whether the observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on
either side of the age threshold before and after the introduction of the labour market
reform. This should be the case if the treatment is locally randomised. I consider the
following observable characteristics: gender, region of birth, education and an indicator
for missing information on education, past experience and an indicator for missing
information on past experience, an indicator of changing sector with respect to the
previous job, an indicator of regional mobility and a bulk of dummy variables capturing
the position of the job episode in the age specific distribution of some characteristics,
measured in a given month and year, such as the number of multiple job spells; the
number of job separations; the number of net job flows (hirings minus separations),
the number of job episodes which benefitted of hiring incentives, a reduction of labour
costs or social insurance benefits.
For each region of work, I report the Tables which show that, with very few excep-
tions, in the age range of ±1 year around the cutoff, differences in discontinuity of the
covariates are statistically equal to zero. That is, overall the covariates are balanced
out and continuous at the threshold implying that there is not precise control of the
assignment variable, the age at which the apprenticeship labour contract is signed.16
The discreteness of the age simplifies the problem of the bandwidth choice when
graphing the data. In fact, I can simply compute and graph the difference in means
between treated and untreated cohorts of the outcome variable for each value of the
discrete assignment variable. The graphical analysis is important since it gives a rough
sense of the relationship and the shape of this relationship between the assignment
variable, the individual’s age, and the difference in the outcome variable before and
after the labour market reform. It thus indicates what functional form is likely to be
supported by the data. In fact, considering the age range of ±1, the linear regression
model fits very well the data since the estimated parameter perfectly matches the raw
data. Because of space constraints (I have to plot this relationship for three outcomes
in each of the 20 regions of work) these graphs are reported in the on-line Appendix
16Worries on precise sorting are related to the age at which job entry as apprentices occurs (if occurs). The
same assumption on the other source of random variation is trivially satisfied. In fact, individuals cannot have
precise manipulation over their year of birth.
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Figure 2. Distributions of number of firms and PISA test scores in reading and math.
A1. They reveal the existence of an instantaneous difference in discontinuity positive
impact on the apprenticeship probability for the large majority of the Italian regions.
The exceptions are Basilicata, Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and
Valle d’Aosta. These regions, rather than reflecting a North-South divide, have in
common the small dimension of their labour markets. The difference in discontinuity
detected for the apprenticeship labour contract translates in the majority of the cases
into difference in discontinuity for the permanent employment probability. The figures
confirm the goodness of fit of the parametric fit of the (local) linear regression in
the range of ±1 year of age around the cutoff. Overall, there is not clear graphical
evidence on a difference in discontinuity effect on the employment probability. These
figures constitute the bulk of the static empirical analysis which sets the premises for
the estimates of the dynamic impact.
The working sample excludes those who have started working or a self-employment
activity, in previous year(s) and those who were unable to have a job spell, even of
one day, in a given year. This is because the discontinuous age requirement refers to
the entrance into apprenticeship. I replicate the previous graphs including also these
individuals. Since a crucial assumption of the difference in discontinuity design is the
continuity around the threshold of the potential outcome, I expect that the age profile
of the apprenticeship labour contract is continuous.17 In fact, there is no indication of
a discontinuity around the age cutoff.
Finally, Figure 2 displays how the number of firms with non-missing values in total
revenues distributes over the Italian regions. Different colours refer to different quar-
tiles of the distribution: from the lightest to the darkest blue. The size of the regional
markets plays clearly a role with smaller or low density regions sitting in the lowest
quartile. From this angle, the north-south divide does not emerge. In contrast, it ap-
pears looking at panel (b) and (c) of the same Figure. All the southern part of Italy,
including main islands, is below the median value of the distribution of the percentage
of students who scored the highest level in math and reading PISA tests.18 All these
preliminary analyses constitute good grounds for the estimation results that follow.
17This is because the apprenticeships can last more than one year.
18Similar pictures can be provided for the distribution of students who scored the minimum level in the math
and reading PISA tests. All southern regions are above the median of the distribution.
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5. Estimation results
5.1. Static model accounting for differential impact across regions
The estimated coefficients on the apprenticeship and permanent employment probabil-
ity match the difference in discontinuity in raw data illustrated in the figures reported
in the on-line Appendix A1. In fact, with the exceptions of Basilicata, Trentino Alto
Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and Valle d’Aosta the instantaneous impact is posi-
tive and statistically significant at 0.05 level.19
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Figure 3. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regions of work
In the on-line Appendix I report for each region a Table whose columns correspond
to different model specifications ranging from a regression model where only region of
work and region of birth dummies are included (column 1), to regression models which
add further baseline characteristics: time fixed effects (month and year dummies in
column 2); sector fixed effects (column 3); firm fixed effects (polynomial of degree 1 in
the employer identification code in column 4); time invariant characteristics (column
5) and time-varying baseline characteristics (column 6). Time invariant characteristics
are the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment, gender, a dummy for miss-
ing information on education and past-experience. Time varying characteristics are a
dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the edu-
cation distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s
educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past-experience is higher
than the 75th percentile of the past-experience distribution at a given age in a given
month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separa-
tions, in a given month and year, higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a
number of net flows (hirings minus separations), in a given month and year, higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if
the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the
job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, and finally
a dummy if the job episode gained from social insurance benefits more than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
19In Figure 3, I compute the 99% confidence intervals to delimit the shaded area.
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The estimated instantaneous impact goes from about 2.6% for Marche to 0.6% for Si-
cilia.20 Overall, the estimated coefficients and standard errors21 are quite stable across
all model specifications. There is more heterogeneity across regions on the estimated
impact on the permanent employment probability. At the baseline of entrance into the
labour market, the permanent employment rates of treated individuals increases from
0.6% (Campania) to about 2 (Lazio and Emilia Romagna) percentage points above
the permanent employment rates of similar untreated individuals. In some regions, the
positive instantaneous impact on the apprenticeship probability translate to an almost
corresponding difference in discontinuity impact on the permanent employment prob-
ability. This is the case for Abruzzo, Campania, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Piemonte
and Veneto. However, in other regions, such as Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Puglia,
Sicilia, Toscana, the effect on permanent employment is not statistically different from
zero and it is even negative and statistically different from zero at 0.05 level in Cal-
abria. Moreover, it could seem puzzling that the difference in discontinuity impact
on permanent employment probability in Lombardia is larger than the estimated ef-
fect for the apprenticeship probability. In principle there could be a larger jump at
the threshold if the permanent employment rate of those aged 30 and untreated by
the labour market reform would be higher than the corresponding rate of similar in-
dividuals affected by the reform. However, the graphical analysis clearly shows that
this argument is not supported by the data. Legislative decree no 76/2013, issued in
June, introduced an incentive to hire on a permanent basis individuals aged less than
30 years. However, age was not the main requirement. Individuals had either to be
unemployed in the previous six months or had to have a dependent family member.
Resources devoted to finance this hiring incentive were limited and administered by the
regional governments. Therefore, the timing and the intensity of the firms’ response to
this policy intervention vary across regions. Month and year dummies and an indicator
function, capturing whether the individual sits above the 25th percentile of the age
distribution of recipients of hiring incentives, are not able to disentangle the impact
at the age threshold on the cohort affected by both law no 92/2012 and legislative
decree no 76/2013 from the difference in discontinuity effect on the cohort affected by
law no 92/2012 only. As a matter of fact, the introduction of time fixed effects reduces
sampling variability while the estimated coefficient is quite stable across model spec-
ification. This is the expected consequence of the randomised variation generated by
the 2012 labour market reform at the age cutoff. If the ITT impact on permanent em-
ployment is entirely related to this randomised source of variation I do not expect an
effect which is statistically different from zero on the employment probability. Legisla-
tive decree no 76/2013 introduced a discontinuity at the age threshold not only in the
permanent employment probability (through apprenticeships) but also in the employ-
ment probability targeting those who were at least 6 months unemployed.22 Overall,
there is not a statistically different from zero impact on the employment probability.
The exceptions are Calabria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Toscana and Umbria whose static
ITT parameters on the employment probability are positive and, albeit rather small,
they are statistically different from zero at 0.1 significance level. The effect is instead
20However, for the subset of regions, where the ITT static parameter on the apprenticeship probability is
positive and statistically different from zero, the confidence intervals mostly overlap.
21Standard errors are clustered at age, year of birth and region of birth level to account for possible autocor-
relation in the environment where the individuals were born.
22There is, instead, no evidence that this Legislative Decree could have increased, at the age cutoff, the rate
of conversions from temporary to permanent contracts. In fact, there are no statistically different from zero
effects on the permanent employment probability conditional on staying in the same firm of the previous job
spell. These results are available from request from the author.
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negative in Sardegna and Valle d’Aosta (at 0.1 significance level).
This evidence suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity across regions on the
type of labour contract used to enter in the labour market on a permanent basis. In
some regions the apprenticeship labour contract serves as the main port of entry, while
in others it seems to play a relevant but not exclusive role. To provide a comprehensive
view, it is important to look at the dynamic effects.
5.2. Dynamic model accounting for differential impact across regions
A statistically different from zero medium-run impact can be estimated even in absence
of an instantaneous effect. This occurs if the labour market reform has improved the
quality of the apprenticeship labour contract. In fact, law no 92/2012 has strengthened
the commitment of the contract on the training provided.
0
.
05
.
1
R
eg
io
na
l d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 d
isc
on
tin
ui
ty
 e
ffe
ct
AB
R
BA
S
TA
A
CA
L
CA
M ER FV
G
LA
Z
LI
G
LO
M
M
AR
M
O
L
PI
E
PU
G
SA
R
SI
C
TO
S
UM
B
Vd
A
VE
N
Region of work
99% Confidence Intervals Estimated Effect
Apprenticeship probability
(a) After 12 months.
−
.
05
0
.
05
R
eg
io
na
l d
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 d
isc
on
tin
ui
ty
 e
ffe
ct
AB
R
BA
S
TA
A
CA
L
CA
M ER FV
G
LA
Z
LI
G
LO
M
M
AR
M
O
L
PI
E
PU
G
SA
R
SI
C
TO
S
UM
B
Vd
A
VE
N
Region of work
99% Confidence Intervals Estimated Effect
Employment probability
(b) After 12 months.
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(c) After 12 months.
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(d) After 24 months.
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(e) After 24 months.
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(f) After 24 months.
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(g) After 30 months.
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(h) After 30 months.
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(i) After 30 months.
Figure 4. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regions of work over time
To underline and discuss the main results, I will focus on the ITT parameters after
12, 24 and 30 months from the baseline on the apprenticeship probability, on the
employment probability and on the permanent employment probability.23
23It is worth estimating the dynamic model also for the apprenticeship rate since the maximum length of the
contract is 3 years. This length could be extended by collective agreements.
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Figure 4 shows that Molise is the only region where a positive difference in discon-
tinuity impact on the apprenticeship probability is never estimated. In all the other
regions, over time, the apprenticeship probability of those treated by the labour mar-
ket reform at the age cutoff, is higher than the same probability of similar untreated
individuals. The existence of a tax rebate for apprenticeships can not explain these
medium-run positive effects. In fact, the tax rebate was also present before the labour
market reform. Yet, these findings could possibly indicate that the commitment to
providing vocational training and general education has increased. Consequently, the
human capital component of the apprenticeship labour contract has risen leading to
a moderate medium-run impact on the permanent employment probability. In fact,
with the exception of Calabria and Molise, the medium run ITT parameters on the
permanent employment of all the other regions after 12, 24 and 30 months from the
baseline is positive and statically different from zero. In contrast, overall there is no
medium-run effect on the employment probability. After 30 months from the baseline,
the permanent employment probability of those treated at the age cutoff, increased
from about 11% in Trentino Alto Adige to 3.2% in Puglia, compared to the same prob-
ability for similar untreated individuals. Evidence from Trentino Alto Adige seems to
indicate that the labour market reform could have affected not only the quantity but
also the quality of the human capital component of the apprenticeship labour con-
tract. In fact, any statistically different from zero effect on permanent employment
probability is detected at the baseline, while the medium-run impact is much larger
than the same impact in other regions (e.g. it is about 7.3% in Lombardia).
All in all, these findings support the view that a labour contract which invests
in human capital serves as a stepping stone into permanent employment. However,
the impact is quite heterogenous across regions. In the medium-run, the North-South
divide clearly emerges with southern regions experiencing much lower permanent em-
ployment gains over time. To better interpret these results I move in two directions.
First, I will compare heterogeneity in the ITT parameters across regions of work to
heterogeneity in these coefficients across regions of birth. This is not because the mi-
gration decision is related to the labour market reform evaluated at the age cutoff.
Yet, the region of birth in the majority of cases constitutes the environment where
the individual grew up and was educated. If there are complementarities between for-
mer education at school and vocational training, some regions could experience larger
permanent employment gains than others. On the top of that, the region of birth is
the main local labour market where the individual searches for job opportunities. Sec-
ond, I study whether the quantity of apprentices in a given region may depend on the
regional production system.
5.3. Does the environment where the individual was born matter?
I now replicate the previous analysis verifying whether there are differential impact
across regions of birth rather than regions of work. Trentino Alto Adige, Molise and
Sardegna are the only regions where the instantaneous ITT parameter is not sta-
tistically different from zero. In contrast, for Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romagna,
Liguria, Piemonte, Puglia and Sicilia the static impact on the apprenticeship rate
is slightly higher than the corresponding effect estimated for those who are working
in these regions. This positive gain is, instead, moderate for Basilicata, Lombardia,
Marche, Valle d’Aosta and Veneto. The 21th region of birth gathers all foreign workers.
For them, the static ITT impact is positive and statically different from zero. However,
17
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Figure 5. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regions of birth
it is smaller when compared to the corresponding impact for individuals born in all the
other regions. The previous analysis has pointed to the importance of heterogenous
static ITT parameters across the regions of work. To what extent a static positive
impact on the apprenticeship rate translates into an effect on the permanent employ-
ment probability depends also on the region where migrants work.24 I do not expect,
consequently, that the impact on the permanent employment probability matches the
effect on the apprenticeship rate. Figure 5 illustrates that the static ITT parameter
on the permanent employment probability is positive and statistically different from
zero for Campania, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Lombardia, Marche, Piemonte, Veneto
and for those born abroad. Overall there is no effect on the employment probability
with the exception of foreign workers who could possibly be the recipients of the hiring
incentive fixed by legislative decree no 76/2013.
Figure 6 presents the dynamic ITT parameters on the outcomes of interest after 12,
24 and 30 months from the baseline allowing for heterogenous effects across regions of
birth. The Figure confirms the picture presented in the previous paragraph.
With the only exception of Molise, individuals treated by the labour market reform
at the age cutoff increased their permanent employment rate compared to untreated
individuals. While there are no significant effects for those working in Molise, the
difference in discontinuity impact on the apprenticeship probability for those who were
born there, is positive and statistically different from zero after 12, 24 and 30 months.
However, the corresponding positive gain in terms of permanent employment vanishes
out after 24 months. At 30 months from the baseline, those born in Trentino Alto
Adige benefit of the highest impact on the permanent employment rate (about 12.7%)
followed by Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Umbria, Piemonte and Toscana (around 8%).
The difference in discontinuity medium-run impact for those born in Sardegna and
Puglia is in the same order of magnitude of the corresponding impact for those working
in these regions. Those who were born in Abruzzo, Trentino Alto Adige, Campania,
Friuli Venezia Giulia and Sicilia (Liguria) and treated by the labour market reform at
the age threshold increased their permanent employment probability more (less) than
1% compared to the corresponding impact on those working in these regions. Finally,
workers born in Calabria and Basilicata gain more if they migrate but less than 1%
compared to those who work in these regions.
The current literature on the determinants of a labour contract which increases hu-
man capital has mainly emphasised the role of commitment (Dustmann & Scho¨nberg,
2012) to the training and education provision in a framework of asymmetric infor-
24The data do not contain the information on the timing of migration. The balancing-out of covariates, however,
suggest that the migration decision is independent from the treatment.
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(b) After 12 months.
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(c) After 12 months.
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(d) After 24 months.
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(e) After 24 months.
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(f) After 24 months.
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(g) After 30 months.
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(h) After 30 months.
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(i) After 30 months.
Figure 6. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regions of birth over time
mation (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998, 1999). In such a setting the commitment to the
human capital investment constitutes a necessary requirement. The successfulness of
the apprenticeship labour contract to serve as a port of entry into permanent em-
ployment could also depend on whether and to what extent the complementarities
between the on-the-job human capital accumulation and the individual’s competen-
cies and skills are related to the sorting of the individuals and to the screening of
the firms in a given job. These sorting-screening processes could be driven by signals
which are observable. The general education level, and where it was achieved, stands
above all the other signals. If this true, the educational and other observational signals
of the migrants could be much weaker than that of the locals because firms are much
better informed on the educational and environmental context of the region where
they operate.
Figure 7 displays the differences in discontinuity on the outcomes of interest al-
lowing for a differential impact across regions conditioning on the migration status.
That is, it is verified whether the effect is different for those who were born (and likely
grew up) in the region where they work compared to those who were born outside
the region. Consistently with previous findings Basilicata, Trentino, Molise, Sardegna,
Umbria and Valle d’Aosta are the only regions where the static ITT parameter is
not statistically significant from zero neither for those born in the region nor for all
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the others. In all the other regions at the age cutoff, the apprenticeship probability
for regional natives, treated by the labour market reform, increased compared to the
apprenticeship rate of untreated individuals. In contrast, the corresponding impact for
those who were born outside the region is either statistically identical to zero or neg-
ative. These positive effects on the apprenticeship rate translate into a positive effect
on the permanent employment probability of the natives in Campania, Emilia Ro-
magna, Lazio, Lombardia, Marche, Piemonte and Veneto. Estimates for Friuli Venezia
Giulia seem puzzling. On the one hand, the ITT impact on the apprenticeship rate
of those born in the region is positive while it is negative for those born outside. On
the other hand, at the age cutoff the permanent employment rate of those born in the
(outside) region and treated by the labour market reform is lower (higher) than the
permanent employment rate of untreated individuals. Estimates of the ITT impact
on the permanent employment probability conditional on staying in the same firm
(sector) of the previous job spell are quite similar25 revealing that the effect on the
permanent employment probability is mainly driven by conversions from temporary to
permanent labour contracts. Articles 30-33 of the regional law no 18/2005 settled on
several incentives to encourage firms to convert temporary into open-ended contracts.
The age limit was fixed to 35 years. In principle, a difference in discontinuity impact
in the conversion rate might not be observed and estimated. In practise, the data show
that this is the case, possibly, as a result of the imperfect balancing-out of the gender
dummy.
In the on-line Appendix, I disentangle further the impact at the baseline around
the age cutoff for those treated individuals who were not born in the same region
where they work, distinguishing between those who were born in a neighbouring region
and non-neighbouring regions. There is no statistically different from zero impact
neither for those coming from neighbouring regions nor for all the others coming
from non-neighbouring regions.26 A possible explanation is that the labour market
reform encouraged the investment-oriented usage of the apprenticeship labour contract
reinforcing the commitment to provide vocational training and to maintain the worker
on a permanent basis. These conditions are more likely met if the sorting-screening
processes of individuals and firms improves. The distance between the region of birth
and the region of work does not help improving this process. In fact, this distance,
while it surely reduces mobility costs, it unlikely provides an informational advantage
on the workers-firms unobservable characteristics.
All in all, this evidence points to the importance of the informational content of
the apprenticeship labour contract. The observational signals of those born in the
region where the firm operates are stronger. This let the sorting-screening processes of
individuals and firms be more successful because asymmetric information are reduced
and, possibly, because there could be complementarities between former education
and the on-the-job human capital accumulation process. If this is the case, the same
individual with the same observable and unobservable characteristics would increase
more her productivity in a firm rather than in another. Consequently, disparities across
regions emerge because the strength of these complementarities differs across regions.
This evidence contributes to provide an explanation on why the same type of contract
is more successful to serve as a stepping stone into permanent employment in a region
rather than in another. It helps clarifying why Trentino Alto Adige has the highest
dynamic ITT impact on the permanent employment. Nevertheless, it does not explain
25These results are available from request from the author.
26In Veneto, for instance, this latter impact is statistically different from zero but small and negative.
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(a) On those born in the region.
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(b) On those born in the region.
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(c) On those born in the region.
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(d) On those born outside.
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(e) On those born outside.
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(f) On those born outside.
Figure 7. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across natives and those born outside
completely why in this region there are not significant effects at the baseline. As
a final analysis I consider some characteristics of the regional labour market which
could work as a barrier to increase the quantity and the quality of the apprenticeship
labour contracts.
5.4. The role of the regional labour market
At first glance, the instantaneous ITT impact on the apprenticeship labour contract is
statically not different from zero when the dimension of the regional labour market is
limited (Basilicata, Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and Valle d’Aosta).
The number of productive firms in a region could fix the quantity of the apprenticeship
labour contracts by limiting the successfulness of the screening of the firms and the
sorting of the workers. In fact, considering the framework presented by Cahuc et al.
(2016), the lower the number of productive firms, the lower the expected production
opportunities, the higher the number of temporary job contracts which are created to
fulfill these production opportunities with short expected durations.
I use the AIDA (Bureau van Dijk) database to determine the number of firms
with a non-missing record of total revenues in each region from 2010 to 2014. These
amounts are averaged out across time to possibly smooth out excess of variability in
the number of non-missing information. I then draw the distribution of the resulting
quantities assigning a value equal to 1 to the quartile of the distribution to which the
region belongs.
Figure 8 clearly shows that the instantaneous effect on the apprenticeship rate is
lower at the lowest quartiles albeit it is not much different from the one estimated
at the fourth. However, heterogenous behaviour emerges when looking at the impact
on permanent employment. In fact, there are no difference in discontinuity effects on
permanent employment for those regions that are characterised by a lower (compared
to the other regions) number of productive firms. The dimension of the regional labour
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Figure 8. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across the dimension of the regional labour market
market can be a barrier to the quantity of potential successful apprenticeship labour
contract. The instantaneous ITT impact on the apprenticeship rate for the second and
third quartiles matches the effect on the permanent employment while it is lower for
the fourth quartile. This result might be due to Lombardia region.27 As discussed in
subsection 5.1, Lombardia was the only region where the difference between the impact
on the permanent employment and the effect on the apprenticeship rate approximates
the increase in the employment probability for treated individuals compared to the
employment rate of those untreated.28 Therefore, the dimension of the regional labour
market could be one of the reasons that limits the quantity of the apprenticeship
labour contract.
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Figure 9. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across variance of the regional firms’ total revenues
Apprenticeships, rather than other labour contracts, serve as a stepping stone into
permanent employment if its human capital component translates into an increase
in productivity shared between the firm (higher rents) and the workers (higher fu-
ture earnings). These shared future returns are conditional to a higher probability of
working on a permanent basis in the firm that provided the training. From the em-
ployee perspective there are some analogies with a contract that fix a performance
related pay component of the (future) earnings. The costs of the vocational training
and the general education provided by the contract and the lower initial wage could
be compensated by higher future earnings only if the worker’s productivity increases.
A well-known result of the literature is the negative relationship between uncertainty
and performance related pay. The state of the regional market, an exogenous factor
of production, and other sources of luck, cause the worker’s output to vary even if
27Lombardia is the Italian region with the largest number of firms.
28This positive impact on the employment probability is due entirely to legislative decree no 76/2013. The
graph displays 99% confidence intervals. The ITT static impact on the employment probability at the fourth
quartile is statistically different from zero at 0.05 significance level.
22
she provides effort, (E. Lazear, 1986). Consequently, individuals with the same level
of ability and the same degree of risk aversion could find the apprenticeship labour
contract less appealing in regions where uncertainty is high. I use AIDA data to cal-
culate the variance (averaged out across time) of the distribution of non-missing total
revenues of firms within a region.29 Total revenues are normalised by the number of
firms in the region. I then calculate the quartiles of the distribution of such regional
variances and estimate whether the static ITT impact differs across these quartiles.
Figure 9 shows that there is not a monotonic relationship between the static esti-
mates of the difference in discontinuity effects and the quartiles of the distribution of
variance. This finding is indicating that there could another possible interpretation
of the role of a high regional variance of the distribution of firms’ total revenues in
a region. In fact, a higher variance could also signal the presence of high productive
firms, (E. Lazear, 2000). If high uncertainty (high variance) could be detrimental to a
human capital investment, a low heterogeneity (low variance) in total revenues could
be detrimental as well, if associated to low firms’ productivity. The combination of
these two counteracting mechanisms could generate the non-monotonic relationship
observed in the data. Although the difference in discontinuity impacts on the appren-
ticeship rates are always precisely estimated and statistically different from zero, these
effects are higher at the second and fourth quartiles of the variance distribution. This
non-monotonic relationship maps into the effects on permanent employment that are
statistically different from zero at the second and fourth quartiles of the variance dis-
tribution only.30 All in all, this evidence suggests that uncertainty could play a role
but the screening-sorting processes that let the apprenticeship labour contract be the
main port of entry into permanent employment is related to a context where firms’
productivity (i.e. firms with long-term expected production opportunities) is not low.
Although these long-term expected production opportunities might be considered as
a necessary condition, they could not be sufficient to completely explain the regional
differences in the dynamic difference in discontinuity impacts.
The quality of the regional educational system could potentially be a springboard
to permanent employment if there are complementarities between former education,
training and labour market experience. These complementarities could reinforce the
informational content of the observational signals that individuals can provide. If this
the case, the probability that the screening-sorting processes succeed increase. More-
over, in regions, where the quality of the regional education system is higher, these
complementarities strengthen the initial advantages leading to a higher permanent em-
ployment gain over time. I use ISTAT data on the regional percentage of those, aged
15, who scored the minimum and the maximum level in the PISA test in mathematics
and reading. These percentages are then averaged out over time (2006-2015).31
The first (second) row of Figure 10 displays the difference in discontinuity effects on
the outcomes of interest across quartiles of the distribution of the percentage of those
who scored the minimum (maximum) level in the math test. That is, the quality is
higher, the lower (higher) the quartile which the region belongs to (i.e. the lower (the
29Firms’ productivity could be proxied by the firm’s per worker value added. However, the number of firms
with a non-missing record shrinks too much when alternative measures to the firms’ total revenues are used.
30The effect on permanent employment at the fourth quartile matches the impact on the apprenticeship
probability. It is instead higher at the second quartile. The latter is the only quartile where a positive impact
on the employment probability could be observed albeit it is imprecisely estimated since it is statistically
different from zero at 0.12 significance level.
31Even though students involved in these tests are younger than those considered in my analysis, this might
not be an issue. In fact, what is relevant to the analysis that will follow is the regional ranking (quartiles of
the distribution of the average regional score) that is quite stable over time.
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Figure 10. Difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regional level of math PISA test scores
higher) the percentage is). Clearly, the lowest quality is associated to the smallest ITT
impact on the apprenticeship rate. Moreover, the permanent employment probability
at the age cutoff of treated individuals compared to the permanent employment rate of
those untreated are not statistically different when the regional quality of the education
system is low. Similar results, reported in the on-line Appendix, can be found when
I use the score in the reading performance test. This evidence suggests that it is
more likely that the apprenticeship labour contract serves as a stepping stone into
permanent employment in a context where the quality of the former education system
is not too low. Differences in the impact across quartiles of the distribution of the
regional percentage of those who scored the minimum (maximum) level in the math
and reading performance amplify over time. After 30 months from the baseline, the
positive dynamic ITT impact associated to the regions with the lowest educational
performance is equal to 4% and it doubles to about 8% for the regions with the
highest educational achievements. The size of this differential is consistent across the
four indicators of performance used. That is the North-South divide on the impacts
on permanent employment discussed in subsection 5.2 can be mapped to the clear
North-South strong divide in schooling performances. For instance regions that have
the highest (lowest) percentage of students who just scored the minimum level in the
math test are: Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia (Trentino
Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lombardia and Veneto). This North-South divide
dualised further the Italian dual labour market.
When complementarities between former education and further human capital ac-
cumulation are strong, the medium-run gain in terms of permanent employment can
be moderate. This holds true even if the quantity of the potential successful matches is
limited by a fixed number of productive firms, as the estimates for Trentino suggests.
When the quality of the education system is low, the capacity of the apprenticeship
labour contract to serve as a stepping stone into permanent employment is limited.
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(a) Minimum level math.
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(b) Maximum level math.
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(c) Minimum level reading.
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(d) Maximum level reading.
Figure 11. Dynamic difference in discontinuity: differential impact across regional level of PISA test scores
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates under which circumstances a labour contract, committed to
the provision of human capital investment, succeeds in creating a job match that per-
sists over time. I analyse the role of the quality of the regional general education and
production systems. I exploit the conditional independent assumption between the
location of work and the randomised variability introduced by a labour market reform
at the age cutoff of 30 years, above which job entry as apprentice is not possible. This
setting allows me to design a difference in discontinuity regression model that cannot
suffer from endogeneity issues when dealing with heterogeneous effects across regions.
I find that the Italian North-South divide in the quality of general education maps into
and further amplifies the North-South divide in labour market performances. This is
possibly because of the existence of complementarities between former education and
on-the-job human capital accumulation. Moreover, the limited number of productive
firms in a region is a barrier to the quantity of job entries as apprentices. The rich
administrative dataset used for the analysis does not contain information on earn-
ings. For this reason, the paper focuses on (permanent) employment effects only. An
evaluation of the impact on earnings would be important to strengthen the interpre-
tation that the apprenticeship labour contract has an advantage over other contracts
in creating good quality jobs. This is left to future research.
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Content
This appendix is organised as follows. Section A1 is devoted to illustrating the empiri-
cal analysis region by region. For each region, I start from the statistical tests and the
descriptive statistics which validate the analysis. The Lagrange Multiplier tests are
based on the procedure suggested by Lee and Card (2008) and apply to all the out-
comes of interest (apprenticeship probability, employment probability and permanent
employment probability). The main descriptive statistics is displayed in the tables
which report the test on the balancing out of covariates at the threshold and in the
graphs that illustrate the difference in discontinuity on the outcomes. Tables on the
static model estimates are then presented.
Section B1 supplies additional Figures to those presented in the main text. More-
over, it draws on Maida and Sonedda (2019) to derive the difference in discontinuity
parameter using the potential outcomes framework.
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Appendix A1. Empirical analysis region by region
A1.1. Abruzzo
Table A1. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 124.068 252.270 0 40.076 112.854
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 82.124 165.776 9.940 69.618
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 61.608 0.043 14.925
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 50.327 0 2.322
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A2. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.932 2.944 0 1.035 16.279
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.274 0.951 0.291 14.652
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.720 0.224 13.422
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.410 0 1.133
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A3. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.756 54.854 0 11.634 65.081
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.356 30.684 11.893 45.231
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.957 2.594 22.050
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.137 0 7.733
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A4. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.018∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ 0.018 0.011
0.004 0.003 0.021 0.023
Region of birth −1.681∗∗∗ −0.234 −1.681 −2.908
0.400 0.282 3.354 3.169
Education 0.194 −0.786∗∗∗ 0.194 −0.367
0.204 0.143 1.418 1.212
Missing education −0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ −0.016 0.006
0.004 0.003 0.021 0.021
Past experience −133.832∗∗∗ −209.598∗∗∗ −133.832 −119.361
5.842 4.135 101.198 94.884
Missing past exp. 0.030∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.030 0.011
0.004 0.003 0.054 0.054
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.009∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.009 −0.000
0.004 0.003 0.012 0.012
Regional mobility −0.042∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.042 −0.046
0.004 0.003 0.040 0.037
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.001 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.005
0.004 0.003 0.078 0.073
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.005∗∗ 0.000 −0.005 −0.007
0.002 0.002 0.012 0.011
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004
0.003 0.002 0.015 0.015
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.013∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.013 0.011
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.013
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.002 −0.001
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A1. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A5. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00877 -.00856 -.00874 -.01018 -.01006 .00152
.03597 .01204 .01217 .01217 .01165 .00592
Apprenticeship prob. .01677∗∗∗ .0168∗∗∗ .01678∗∗∗ .01682∗∗∗ .01669∗∗∗ .01709∗∗∗
.00422 .00412 .0039 .00389 .00368 .00377
Perm. Employment prob. .00928 .00942 .00915 .00877 .00849 .01234∗∗
.01142 .0078 .00677 .00677 .00683 .00623
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile
of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode
benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a
given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.2. Basilicata
Table A6. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 42.468 79.674 0 36.749 65.368
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 27.885 50.415 32.625 46.663
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 21.550 0.468 33.634
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 17.609 0 29.860
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A7. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.696 4.949 0 10.659 38.466
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.587 1.265 11.095 27.892
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.539 0.010 23.072
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.406 0 21.412
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A8. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.696 12.022 0 34.607 53.944
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 1.614 8.612 30.164 47.809
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 8.167 6.133 43.654
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.131 0 36.345
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A9. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.041∗∗∗ 0.006 0.041 0.025
0.006 0.004 0.029 0.031
Region of birth 2.689∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗ 2.689 1.045
0.544 0.384 3.047 2.949
Education 0.202 −0.113 0.202 0.386
0.274 0.194 1.146 0.943
Missing education −0.016∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.016 −0.011
0.006 0.004 0.026 0.021
Past experience −138.036∗∗∗ −221.749∗∗∗ −138.036 −93.856
7.633 5.339 116.198 102.814
Missing past exp. 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046 0.042
0.005 0.004 0.057 0.058
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.019∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.012
0.005 0.004 0.032 0.026
Regional mobility −0.017∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.017 −0.022
0.006 0.004 0.029 0.023
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells 0.002 0.017∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.007
0.006 0.004 0.057 0.055
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.001 −0.005∗ −0.001 −0.001
0.004 0.003 0.015 0.015
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.004 −0.006∗∗ 0.004 0.005
0.004 0.003 0.021 0.018
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.015∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015 0.009
0.003 0.002 0.016 0.015
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A2. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A10. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00789 .00486 .0026 .0037 .0113 .00766
.03302 .02099 .02063 .02087 .01974 .01117
Apprenticeship prob. .0077 .00769 .00749 .00746 .00754 .00778
.0068 .00674 .00635 .00636 .00626 .00641
Perm. Employment prob. .00135 .00066 -.00173 -.00144 -.00061 -.00231
.01636 .01412 .01326 .0132 .01317 .0125
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time
of recruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience.
Time-varying baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is
higher than the 25th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month
and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s
past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at
a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the
worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job
separations higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus
separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile
of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if
the job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a
dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.3. Trentino Alto Adige
Table A11. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 46.737 122.359 0 54.093 271.024
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 7.824 19.355 6.829 105.867
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 10.172 0.002 16.495
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 4.017 0 0.088
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A12. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.036 6.771 0 15.950 32.541
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 2.009 6.454 16.014 30.669
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.442 4.393 24.126
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.223 0 21.473
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A13. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 69.550 73.781 0 29.087 75.970
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 44.365 73.759 12.760 75.736
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 73.750 8.003 47.407
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 47.389 0 18.491
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A14. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.027∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.016
0.004 0.003 0.022 0.024
Region of birth 1.619∗∗∗ 3.100∗∗∗ 1.619 1.021
0.377 0.265 2.208 2.325
Education −0.943∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −0.943 −0.802
0.201 0.141 1.182 1.295
Missing education 0.012∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012 0.003
0.004 0.003 0.022 0.025
Past experience −93.083∗∗∗ −206.196∗∗∗ −93.083 −64.729
6.127 4.286 109.357 115.170
Missing past exp. 0.005 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.005
0.004 0.002 0.020 0.022
Region of work 0.127∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.127 0.176
0.063 0.044 0.319 0.335
Changing sector 0.006∗ 0.003 0.006 0.008
0.003 0.002 0.011 0.010
Regional mobility 0.008∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008 0.003
0.004 0.003 0.021 0.021
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.007
0.004 0.003 0.074 0.072
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001
0.002 0.002 0.016 0.015
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.002 −0.005∗∗ −0.002 −0.003
0.003 0.002 0.006 0.005
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is
±1(2). Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
the job episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of
interest, for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A3. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A15. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00283 .00077 .00162 .00162 .0052 -.00415
.03469 .02027 .02039 .01968 .01879 .00921
Apprenticeship prob. -.00016 -.00018 -.00024 -.00024 -.00027 -.0005
.00242 .00262 .00266 .00265 .00265 .0027
Perm. Employment prob. -.01595 -.01561 -.01465 -.01465 -.01686∗ -.01593∗
.01049 .01138 .01018 .01014 .00998 .00946
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of
recruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-
varying baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 25th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year;
a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience
is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a given age in a given
month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of multiple
job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode
is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile
of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring
incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a
given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and
year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.4. Calabria
Table A16. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 125.592 306.531 0 118.915 241.789
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 22.152 89.845 5.252 40.248
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 38.868 0.058 33.685
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 9.499 0 4.777
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A17. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.291 3.575 0 15.208 20.784
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.228 2.516 12.240 21.146
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.863 8.850 18.339
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.402 0 16.752
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A18. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.253 39.853 0 17.381 67.796
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.782 6.644 12.379 30.270
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.734 1.301 14.367
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.714 0 8.198
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A19. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.015
0.003 0.002 0.015 0.015
Region of birth −0.998∗∗∗ −1.734∗∗∗ −0.998 −0.955
0.268 0.190 1.425 1.063
Education −0.402∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗ −0.402 −0.539
0.142 0.100 0.606 0.521
Missing education 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011 0.006
0.003 0.002 0.011 0.010
Past experience −81.350∗∗∗ −144.379∗∗∗ −81.350 −68.274
3.304 2.305 89.716 84.300
Missing past exp. 0.001 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.006
0.003 0.002 0.048 0.041
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.012 0.005
0.002 0.002 0.017 0.019
Regional mobility −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.012
0.003 0.002 0.016 0.012
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.006∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.006 0.000
0.003 0.002 0.084 0.080
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.004∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.004 −0.003
0.002 0.001 0.017 0.017
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.003 −0.003∗ −0.003 −0.002
0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.011
0.001 0.001 0.020 0.020
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is
±1(2). Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
the job episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of
interest, for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A4. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A20. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .03558 .0325∗ .03319∗ .03297∗ .03421∗∗ .00839∗∗
.04723 .01699 .01722 .01735 .01623 .00426
Apprenticeship prob. .00989∗∗∗ .00988∗∗∗ .00972∗∗∗ .00973∗∗∗ .00953∗∗∗ .00904∗∗∗
.00246 .00229 .00218 .00217 .00217 .00207
Perm. Employment prob. -.00795 -.00851 -.00801 -.00806 -.00878 -.01095∗∗
.00707 .0061 .00561 .00573 .00558 .0043
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.5. Campania
Table A21. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 315.794 645.748 0 235.961 350.340
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 109.725 368.321 12.395 139.117
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 148.543 0.675 114.207
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 55.826 0 15.818
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A22. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 6.550 15.341 0 12.862 36.755
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 2.574 4.652 7.650 26.144
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 4.446 7.670 24.783
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.563 0 6.272
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A23. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 16.418 35.824 0 32.007 65.857
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.008 12.282 10.454 34.960
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM −0.001 10.150 10.051 24.008
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM −0.001 0.114 0.001 9.105
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A24. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.001 0.006∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012
Region of birth −0.135 0.041 −0.135 −0.536
0.174 0.123 0.667 0.711
Education −1.195∗∗∗ −1.423∗∗∗ −1.195 −1.102
0.098 0.070 0.864 0.935
Missing education 0.004∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004 0.001
0.002 0.001 0.009 0.009
Past experience −86.581∗∗∗ −182.968∗∗∗ −86.581 −72.788
2.853 1.986 88.277 87.371
Missing past exp. −0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.016
0.002 0.002 0.038 0.034
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.015 0.013
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.014
Regional mobility −0.003 0.004∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.009
0.002 0.001 0.008 0.009
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.003 0.004∗∗ −0.003 −0.001
0.002 0.002 0.072 0.068
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005 0.005
0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.003∗ 0.001 0.003 0.004
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004 0.005
0.001 0.001 0.016 0.015
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001∗∗∗ 0 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is
±1(2). Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
the job episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of
interest, for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A5. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A25. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00522 .00164 .00206 .00236 .00103 -.00385
.04277 .00863 .00818 .00813 .00814 .00358
Apprenticeship prob. .00773∗∗∗ .00773∗∗∗ .00738∗∗∗ .00737∗∗∗ .00754∗∗∗ .00749∗∗∗
.00181 .00199 .00193 .00194 .00188 .00194
Perm. Employment prob. .00863 .00778∗∗ .00555∗ .00563∗ .00597∗∗ .00674∗∗
.00712 .00306 .00302 .00302 .003 .00337
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.6. Emilia Romagna
Table A26. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 642.993 1452.951 0 334.957 841.046
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 301.572 638.216 4.326 93.410
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 245.816 0.251 80.231
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 170.636 0 2.987
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A27. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.093 5.388 0 31.395 56.592
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM −0.010 4.070 30.710 55.688
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.101 0.546 43.811
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.112 0 28.526
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A28. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 35.868 154.841 0 39.497 111.039
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 3.430 70.617 2.544 41.716
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 13.074 0.224 15.910
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.262 0 3.638
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A29. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.000 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.007
0.002 0.002 0.015 0.015
Region of birth −0.746∗∗∗ −1.225∗∗∗ −0.746 −1.645
0.214 0.151 1.194 1.027
Education 0.025 −0.310∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.239
0.111 0.078 0.597 0.568
Missing education 0.006∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.006 0.008
0.002 0.002 0.010 0.009
Past experience −136.006∗∗∗ −209.704∗∗∗ −136.006 −117.840
3.436 2.380 94.721 94.576
Missing past exp. 0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001 0.006
0.002 0.001 0.032 0.034
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.006 −0.013∗
0.002 0.001 0.007 0.007
Regional mobility −0.012∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.012∗ −0.017∗∗∗
0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.005∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.002
0.002 0.002 0.049 0.048
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.003∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.003
0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.003∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.004
0.002 0.001 0.019 0.018
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0 0.001∗∗∗ 0 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
.
3
.
35
.
4
.
45
Pe
rm
an
en
t jo
b p
rob
ab
ilit
y
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Age deviation from 30
Pre Reform Cohorts Post Reform Cohorts
Data Source: CICO
Age profile across treatment
(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A6. Difference in discontinuities.
24
Table A30. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00602 -.00555 -.00599 -.00665 -.00277 .00114
.02407 .00916 .00909 .00898 .00935 .00398
Apprenticeship prob. .02021∗∗∗ .02024∗∗∗ .02032∗∗∗ .02034∗∗∗ .02025∗∗∗ .02017∗∗∗
.00502 .00475 .00479 .00479 .00475 .00468
Perm. Employment prob. .01589∗ .01612∗∗∗ .01725∗∗∗ .01707∗∗∗ .01666∗∗∗ .01825∗∗∗
.00823 .00618 .00618 .00618 .00621 .00588
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.7. Friuli Venezia Giulia
Table A31. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 90.090 197.795 0 32.154 115.301
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 54.124 74.363 0.190 5.228
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 37.437 0.013 3.919
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 34.578 0 0.503
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A32. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.530 7.993 0 5.745 13.690
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.803 7.583 3.516 11.417
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.339 0.288 9.334
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.324 0 6.518
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A33. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 23.290 45.785 0 43.138 92.749
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 5.310 31.733 15.657 82.790
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 26.333 12.965 64.952
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 8.072 0 18.100
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A34. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.028∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.027∗
0.006 0.004 0.014 0.015
Region of birth −3.768∗∗∗ −3.325∗∗∗ −3.768 −4.867
0.476 0.335 3.051 3.264
Education 2.479∗∗∗ 2.367∗∗∗ 2.479 2.896∗
0.267 0.188 1.529 1.584
Missing education −0.030∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.030 −0.039
0.004 0.003 0.024 0.025
Past experience −116.467∗∗∗ −268.193∗∗∗ −116.467 −137.444
8.196 5.814 106.386 109.115
Missing past exp. −0.010∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.005
0.005 0.003 0.042 0.048
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.014
0.005 0.003 0.018 0.020
Regional mobility −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.028
0.005 0.004 0.032 0.033
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.008 0.011∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.007
0.005 0.004 0.065 0.059
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.000 −0.002 −0.000 0.003
0.003 0.002 0.009 0.010
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005
0.004 0.003 0.017 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.002
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Ap
pr
en
tic
es
hi
p 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Age deviation from 30
Pre Reform Cohorts Post Reform Cohorts
Data Source: CICO
Age profile across treatment
(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A7. Difference in discontinuities.
28
Table A35. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00071 .0014 .00175 .00106 -.00002 -.00263
.03422 .02001 .01979 .02005 .01797 .00966
Apprenticeship prob. .01757∗∗∗ .01762∗∗∗ .0178∗∗∗ .01782∗∗∗ .01766∗∗∗ .01737∗∗∗
.00627 .00597 .0057 .0057 .00567 .00564
Perm. Employment prob. .00225 .00277 .00318 .00299 .00245 .00229
.01693 .01614 .01666 .01676 .01675 .01484
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile
of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode
benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a
given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.8. Lazio
Table A36. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 1039.092 2512.437 0 411.380 707.464
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 646.624 2173.233 17.588 448.833
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 575.686 1.250 261.787
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 341.371 0 11.154
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A37. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 4.211 20.961 0 6.337 42.013
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 4.017 8.616 5.337 30.239
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.379 4.326 30.333
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.774 0 7.256
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A38. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 141.929 344.229 0 65.534 112.533
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 76.365 347.882 1.422 110.667
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0.002 112.079 0.489 75.254
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0.002 39.302 0 0.772
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A39. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.004∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006
0.002 0.002 0.008 0.007
Region of birth −1.288∗∗∗ 0.213∗ −1.288 −2.163∗
0.172 0.121 1.190 1.113
Education 0.121 −0.480∗∗∗ 0.121 0.280
0.103 0.072 0.455 0.427
Missing education −0.003∗ −0.001 −0.003 −0.005
0.002 0.001 0.010 0.010
Past experience −107.898∗∗∗ −189.427∗∗∗ −107.898 −94.096
2.710 1.870 94.828 89.808
Missing past exp. 0.010∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.010 0.007
0.002 0.001 0.039 0.036
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.017∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.003
0.002 0.001 0.013 0.013
Regional mobility −0.014∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.018∗
0.002 0.002 0.010 0.010
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.003 −0.004∗∗ −0.003 −0.004
0.002 0.002 0.058 0.057
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.002
0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
0.001 0.001 0.017 0.015
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A8. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A40. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00386 -.00483 -.00539 -.00546 -.00545 .00218
.03208 .01033 .01005 .00997 .00961 .00488
Apprenticeship prob. .01921∗∗∗ .01922∗∗∗ .01945∗∗∗ .01945∗∗∗ .01925∗∗∗ .01918∗∗∗
.00416 .00424 .00412 .00412 .00408 .0041
Perm. Employment prob. .01595∗ .01552∗∗ .01586∗∗ .01584∗∗ .01588∗∗ .01871∗∗∗
.00881 .00691 .0065 .00648 .00644 .00573
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.9. Liguria
Table A41. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 213.917 468.950 0 116.629 232.592
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 100.620 291.894 1.615 70.279
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 98.887 0.516 54.766
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 54.055 0 0.826
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A42. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 9.895 19.605 0 13.485 28.332
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.001 19.612 3.242 28.327
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 14.255 2.124 24.469
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.160 0 2.120
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A43. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 36.772 77.950 0 12.411 38.190
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 25.536 42.026 1.293 6.440
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 20.557 0.325 5.727
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 18.941 0 2.505
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A44. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.028∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.028∗ −0.017
0.005 0.003 0.015 0.018
Region of birth 0.657 −0.957∗∗∗ 0.657 0.332
0.406 0.285 3.044 2.555
Education 0.564∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.564 0.258
0.214 0.150 1.170 1.350
Missing education −0.011∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.011
0.004 0.003 0.021 0.024
Past experience −111.521∗∗∗ −209.635∗∗∗ −111.521 −87.946
6.181 4.269 107.455 102.052
Missing past exp. −0.025∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.029
0.004 0.003 0.052 0.043
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.009∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.009 0.004
0.004 0.003 0.017 0.016
Regional mobility 0.006 −0.010∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.006
0.005 0.003 0.018 0.015
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.007 −0.002 −0.007 −0.005
0.005 0.003 0.058 0.053
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.006 −0.006
0.002 0.002 0.009 0.007
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.003 −0.001 0.003 0.004
0.003 0.002 0.019 0.020
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.005∗∗∗ 0 0.005 0.002
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A9. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A45. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.01369 -.00852 -.00658 -.00744 -.01026 -.00462
.02999 .01688 .01677 .01661 .01645 .0068
Apprenticeship prob. .01576∗∗ .0157∗∗ .01572∗∗ .01574∗∗ .01587∗∗ .0159∗∗
.00723 .00723 .00733 .00733 .0072 .00728
Perm. Employment prob. .00142 .00202 .00229 .00206 .00237 .00343
.01564 .01351 .0131 .01309 .01289 .01316
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of re-
cruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying
baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th
percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the
worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given
age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th
percentile of the past experience distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated
to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings
minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode
benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distri-
bution at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year.
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A1.10. Lombardia
Table A46. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 766.575 1800.603 0 594.522 1691.562
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 261.812 474.462 31.109 177.655
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 230.834 2.757 104.763
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 150.035 0 11.333
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that the
functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted regression
of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J possible values
of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If the statistic
exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard error are
clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A47. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 15.637 18.326 0 10.138 21.901
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 15.712 16.994 10.113 18.472
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 15.362 6.926 15.037
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 15.169 0 13.264
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A48. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM −0.005 125.670 205.069 0 50.970 111.869
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 83.427 120.135 17.280 48.900
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM −0.004 80.044 12.073 32.530
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM −0.004 68.701 0 15.710
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A49. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.005∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.008
0.002 0.001 0.016 0.017
Region of birth 1.235∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 1.235 0.764
0.152 0.106 1.112 1.142
Education −0.359∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.359 −0.441
0.090 0.063 0.614 0.596
Missing education −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001
0.002 0.001 0.010 0.009
Past experience −154.522∗∗∗ −237.699∗∗∗ −154.522 −128.363
2.790 1.932 110.320 107.673
Missing past exp. 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015 0.005
0.002 0.001 0.033 0.033
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.007∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.003
0.002 0.001 0.008 0.009
Regional mobility 0.005∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.003
0.002 0.001 0.012 0.011
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.009∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.003
0.002 0.001 0.063 0.060
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.002
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.007∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.006
0.001 0.001 0.016 0.016
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A10. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A50. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00467 .00465 .00603 .00614 .00799 .00889∗∗
.02851 .00596 .00603 .00614 .00646 .00421
Apprenticeship prob. .01178∗∗∗ .01183∗∗∗ .0117∗∗∗ .0117∗∗∗ .01149∗∗∗ .01111∗∗∗
.0039 .00376 .00382 .00382 .00383 .00374
Perm. Employment prob. .02701∗∗∗ .02702∗∗∗ .02734∗∗∗ .02737∗∗∗ .02673∗∗∗ .02898∗∗∗
.00886 .00557 .00559 .0056 .00561 .0055
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.11. Marche
Table A51. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 294.888 597.789 0 89.880 154.023
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 182.639 462.085 0.261 85.330
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 164.400 0.158 54.774
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 108.902 0 0.411
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A52. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.667 11.701 0 8.310 24.714
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 1.923 8.118 8.253 19.412
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 5.298 4.613 9.866
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.994 0 7.393
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A53. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.651 57.476 0 23.188 88.116
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 1.534 36.468 23.031 73.657
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.357 9.517 57.884
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.051 0 35.138
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A54. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.008∗ −0.001 −0.008 −0.001
0.004 0.003 0.025 0.021
Region of birth 2.444∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 2.444 2.927∗∗
0.376 0.265 2.031 1.328
Education −1.773∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗ −1.773 −1.907
0.217 0.152 1.224 1.405
Missing education −0.014∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.015
0.004 0.003 0.017 0.020
Past experience −121.344∗∗∗ −226.785∗∗∗ −121.344 −103.927
6.777 4.754 116.204 104.532
Missing past exp. −0.020∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.004
0.004 0.003 0.047 0.044
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.038∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
0.004 0.003 0.015 0.011
Regional mobility 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.024 0.033
0.004 0.003 0.026 0.019
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells 0.022∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.022 0.017
0.004 0.003 0.054 0.049
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows 0.006∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.006 0.004
0.002 0.002 0.010 0.010
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.006 0.003
0.003 0.002 0.016 0.017
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
.
25
.
3
.
35
.
4
.
45
Pe
rm
an
en
t jo
b p
rob
ab
ilit
y
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Age deviation from 30
Pre Reform Cohorts Post Reform Cohorts
Data Source: CICO
Age profile across treatment
(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A11. Difference in discontinuities.
44
Table A55. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.03192 -.03293∗∗ -.03237∗∗ -.03185∗∗ -.03322∗∗ -.00636
.02991 .01382 .0138 .01391 .01435 .00464
Apprenticeship prob. .02493∗∗ .02501∗∗ .02522∗∗ .02521∗∗ .02493∗∗ .0259∗∗
.01124 .01108 .01105 .01105 .01096 .01099
Perm. Employment prob. .00145 .00199 .00324 .00338 .0029 .00841
.01291 .01108 .01227 .01222 .01222 .01242
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline char-
acteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational
level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month
and year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past expe-
rience distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy
if the worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if
the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of
hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a
given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, and
finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.12. Molise
Table A56. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 11.333 59.292 0 23.056 84.122
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.010 6.506 6.268 9.472
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.402 0.154 3.769
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.284 0 3.651
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A57. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 14.066 34.346 0 1.130 36.165
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 13.152 25.427 0.373 27.195
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 20.531 0.207 5.494
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 17.269 0 0.523
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A58. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 10.223 15.969 0 7.896 13.703
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 4.232 16.068 2.670 13.704
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 10.097 1.963 9.894
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.765 0 2.036
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A59. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.065∗∗∗ 0.012∗ −0.065 0.016
0.010 0.007 0.061 0.066
Region of birth −6.225∗∗∗ −3.209∗∗∗ −6.225∗ −5.233
0.727 0.519 3.026 3.231
Education 2.853∗∗∗ 0.386 2.853 0.870
0.451 0.321 2.022 1.694
Missing education −0.073∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.073∗ −0.061∗∗
0.007 0.005 0.038 0.027
Past experience −101.553∗∗∗ −216.169∗∗∗ −101.553 −121.723
11.780 8.642 101.166 88.056
Missing past exp. 0.002 −0.035∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.006
0.008 0.006 0.077 0.059
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.065∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.065 0.068∗
0.008 0.006 0.038 0.035
Regional mobility −0.062∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.073∗
0.010 0.007 0.043 0.042
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells 0.038∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.038 0.043
0.010 0.007 0.081 0.084
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.011∗∗ 0.002 −0.011 −0.003
0.005 0.004 0.012 0.011
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.008 −0.002 −0.008 −0.001
0.006 0.004 0.014 0.012
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.001 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.009
0.005 0.003 0.019 0.018
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A12. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A60. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.0519 -.04707 -.04719 -.04631 -.05313∗ -.01641
.05443 .02973 .02977 .03043 .02954 .01212
Apprenticeship prob. -.00565 -.00557 -.00512 -.00514 -.00573 -.00441
.00411 .00419 .00436 .00434 .00432 .00432
Perm. Employment prob. .00543 .00626 .01296 .0132 .01241 .02003
.01819 .01827 .01704 .01715 .01784 .01803
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of
recruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-
varying baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 25th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and
year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past
experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a given age
in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number
of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to
1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job
episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of
social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given
age in a given month and year.
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A1.13. Piemonte
Table A61. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 455.289 1055.175 0 251.113 445.371
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 206.922 703.106 5.884 179.070
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 212.943 3.492 118.946
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 103.663 0 7.251
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A62. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 5.358 19.554 0 6.030 26.311
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 4.546 10.545 3.882 9.192
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.953 1.824 8.701
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.960 0 4.993
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A63. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 119.052 168.649 0 48.324 71.515
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 68.618 124.185 2.942 47.266
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 82.173 2.848 35.670
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 54.284 0 3.438
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A64. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.019∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.008
0.003 0.002 0.016 0.015
Region of birth −0.191 0.556∗∗∗ −0.191 −1.181
0.248 0.174 0.545 0.684
Education 0.253∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.253 0.442
0.143 0.101 0.671 0.836
Missing education −0.005∗ −0.002 −0.005 −0.003
0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012
Past experience −143.608∗∗∗ −242.960∗∗∗ −143.608 −119.411
4.685 3.283 119.234 116.914
Missing past exp. 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041 0.037
0.003 0.002 0.048 0.035
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.017∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.010
0.003 0.002 0.015 0.012
Regional mobility 0.001 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.009
0.003 0.002 0.018 0.017
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.001
0.003 0.002 0.055 0.053
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.004
0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.006
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A13. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A65. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .01128 .01039 .01031 .00964 .0157 .01335∗∗
.02671 .01177 .01166 .01154 .01132 .00532
Apprenticeship prob. .02138∗∗∗ .02142∗∗∗ .02149∗∗∗ .0215∗∗∗ .02138∗∗∗ .0208∗∗∗
.00544 .00528 .00519 .0052 .00513 .00497
Perm. Employment prob. .02193 .02226 .02309∗ .02292∗ .02314∗ .02433∗
.01585 .01371 .01307 .01302 .01309 .01255
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at
a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number
of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile
of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to
a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the
25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if
the job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a
given month and year.
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A1.14. Puglia
Table A66. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 211.571 433.528 0 85.199 287.571
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 122.893 177.875 27.702 42.751
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 90.341 0.413 42.173
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 78.715 0 31.098
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A67. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 5.178 25.992 0 9.744 31.222
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.958 7.796 5.057 14.015
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.350 4.869 7.040
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.006 0 5.108
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A68. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0.001 39.825 66.661 0 35.881 64.795
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 17.122 64.716 6.087 56.895
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0.001 46.033 5.045 50.382
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0.001 12.834 −0.001 10.758
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A69. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.023∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.031∗
0.002 0.002 0.020 0.017
Region of birth 0.841∗∗∗ 0.068 0.841 −0.318
0.173 0.123 0.948 1.145
Education −1.570∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗ −1.570∗ −1.314
0.097 0.069 0.714 0.767
Missing education 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015 0.012
0.002 0.001 0.011 0.011
Past experience −113.259∗∗∗ −184.737∗∗∗ −113.259 −83.919
2.937 2.043 112.449 105.271
Missing past exp. 0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.005
0.002 0.001 0.062 0.057
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.006 −0.004
0.002 0.001 0.017 0.019
Regional mobility 0.011∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.001
0.002 0.002 0.013 0.016
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells 0.005∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 0.011
0.002 0.002 0.058 0.056
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.001 0.002∗ −0.001 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.013 0.012
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.002 −0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.004
0.002 0.001 0.015 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
0.001 0.001 0.013 0.012
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.002∗
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A14. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A70. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00264 -.0034 -.00281 -.00303 -.00435 .00318
.03713 .00932 .00938 .00966 .01037 .00558
Apprenticeship prob. .00751∗∗∗ .00746∗∗∗ .00715∗∗∗ .00715∗∗∗ .00756∗∗∗ .00809∗∗∗
.0025 .00241 .00223 .00223 .00217 .00214
Perm. Employment prob. -.00075 -.00104 -.00232 -.00238 -.00197 -.00021
.0087 .00533 .00397 .00402 .00412 .00364
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.15. Sardegna
Table A71. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 68.461 161.636 0 51.195 159.713
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 36.524 45.702 14.202 26.584
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 25.439 0.319 11.859
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 23.413 0 8.742
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A72. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 3.184 5.057 0 4.150 14.410
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.098 5.008 0.626 14.463
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 4.150 0.571 7.254
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.020 0 1.201
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A73. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 18.897 58.930 0 22.348 53.340
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.099 23.960 2.236 24.616
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 10.231 1.921 14.953
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.143 0 2.129
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A74. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.032∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.044∗∗∗
0.004 0.003 0.016 0.013
Region of birth 0.074 0.126 0.074 −0.817
0.208 0.147 1.353 1.365
Education 0.539∗∗∗ 0.022 0.539 0.823
0.169 0.119 1.118 1.193
Missing education 0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.001
0.003 0.002 0.013 0.013
Past experience −76.794∗∗∗ −160.479∗∗∗ −76.794 −29.323
4.861 3.409 113.574 109.480
Missing past exp. −0.018∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.042
0.003 0.002 0.067 0.068
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.018∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018 0.024
0.003 0.002 0.016 0.014
Regional mobility −0.025∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.025∗ −0.037∗∗
0.003 0.002 0.013 0.015
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.001 −0.005∗ −0.001 −0.008
0.004 0.003 0.065 0.063
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.004∗ −0.002 −0.004 −0.004
0.002 0.002 0.017 0.016
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows 0.001 −0.000 0.001 0.000
0.003 0.002 0.017 0.016
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction −0.007∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.002
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.014
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is
±1(2). Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
the job episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of
interest, for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
59
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
Ap
pr
en
tic
es
hi
p 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Age deviation from 30
Pre Reform Cohorts Post Reform Cohorts
Data Source: CICO
Discontinuities in age profile across treatment
(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
.
04
.
06
.
08
.
1
.
12
Pe
rm
an
en
t jo
b p
rob
ab
ilit
y
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Age deviation from 30
Pre Reform Cohorts Post Reform Cohorts
Data Source: CICO
Discontinuities in age profile across treatment
(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A15. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A75. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.0031 -.00165 -.00047 -.00031 -.00615 -.00697∗
.04194 .00866 .00824 .00834 .01041 .00397
Apprenticeship prob. .00036 .00036 .00017 .00017 -.00036 -.00057
.00216 .00254 .00255 .00255 .00256 .00259
Perm. Employment prob. -.00157 -.00119 -.00061 -.00057 -.0022 -.00288
.00908 .00644 .00662 .00658 .00668 .00569
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of
recruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-
varying baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 25th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and
year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past
experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a given age
in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number
of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to
1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job
episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of
social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given
age in a given month and year.
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A1.16. Sicilia
Table A76. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 324.424 619.238 0 128.471 279.055
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 177.340 322.165 0.006 44.250
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 147.081 −0.007 39.246
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 108.608 −0.001 0.095
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A77. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 6.381 24.772 0 33.846 47.650
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.026 25.216 21.369 45.982
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 7.219 11.829 30.732
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.286 0 22.383
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A78. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 26.585 122.292 0 24.228 105.024
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 27.063 63.689 22.442 46.455
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 32.497 19.030 45.806
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 19.094 −0.001 23.784
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A79. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.004 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002
0.002 0.002 0.015 0.014
Region of birth 0.003 −0.426∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.296
0.157 0.111 1.248 0.962
Education −0.155 −0.102 −0.155 −0.596
0.097 0.068 0.771 0.791
Missing education −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.001
0.002 0.001 0.011 0.011
Past experience −129.579∗∗∗ −198.968∗∗∗ −129.579 −100.850
2.900 2.039 104.744 96.112
Missing past exp. 0.015∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.015 0.008
0.002 0.002 0.038 0.035
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.011 0.011
0.002 0.001 0.018 0.018
Regional mobility 0.005∗∗ −0.000 0.005 −0.001
0.002 0.001 0.016 0.015
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.000 0.003∗ −0.000 −0.008
0.002 0.002 0.063 0.062
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
0.001 0.001 0.014 0.014
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.001
0.002 0.001 0.013 0.012
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.005 0.008
0.001 0.001 0.018 0.018
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 0.001 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A16. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A80. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .01961 .01748∗∗∗ .0185∗∗∗ .01801∗∗∗ .01705∗∗ .00143
.03979 .00644 .00639 .00648 .0074 .00537
Apprenticeship prob. .00666∗∗∗ .00667∗∗ .0064∗∗ .00641∗∗ .00624∗∗ .00613∗∗
.00243 .00263 .00257 .00257 .00264 .00261
Perm. Employment prob. .00485 .00447 .00536 .00523 .00433 .00262
.00774 .00616 .00559 .00563 .00547 .00592
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline char-
acteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational
level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and
year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the
worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the
25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode
is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and
year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job
episode benefitted of social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.17. Toscana
Table A81. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 425.812 1058.264 0 267.449 653.391
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 176.113 399.817 10.428 91.667
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 145.688 0.119 70.363
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 96.496 0 15.947
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A82. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 22.559 29.879 0 8.756 13.171
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 15.876 29.284 5.052 13.032
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 18.437 1.455 11.853
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 12.462 0 5.568
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A83. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 60.657 162.523 0 35.676 77.273
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 26.090 98.483 1.440 34.229
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 28.699 0.643 18.599
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 13.868 0 2.963
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A84. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.005∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.003
0.003 0.002 0.020 0.023
Region of birth −1.689∗∗∗ −0.920∗∗∗ −1.689 −2.509∗∗
0.223 0.158 1.376 1.192
Education −0.296∗∗ −0.059 −0.296 −0.303
0.125 0.088 0.683 0.679
Missing education −0.003 0.005∗∗∗ −0.003 0.003
0.002 0.002 0.012 0.013
Past experience −126.220∗∗∗ −226.702∗∗∗ −126.220 −117.887
3.913 2.743 102.074 101.511
Missing past exp. 0.018∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018 0.018
0.002 0.002 0.028 0.027
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.008∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.004
0.002 0.002 0.008 0.007
Regional mobility −0.022∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.022∗ −0.030∗∗
0.003 0.002 0.011 0.012
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.017∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.015
0.003 0.002 0.055 0.051
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.007
0.001 0.001 0.012 0.012
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.000 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.002
0.002 0.001 0.014 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A17. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A85. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00396 .00698 .00707 .00708 .01311∗ .00698
.02611 .00739 .00716 .0073 .00789 .00432
Apprenticeship prob. .01801∗∗∗ .01793∗∗∗ .01783∗∗∗ .01783∗∗∗ .01762∗∗∗ .01707∗∗∗
.00545 .00529 .00535 .00536 .00524 .00512
Perm. Employment prob. .01417 .01441 .01417 .01417 .01311 .01393
.01173 .01021 .01028 .01025 .01031 .00994
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruitment,
gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline character-
istics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile of the education
distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy
if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a
given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of
multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number
of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the
corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age
in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than
the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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A1.18. Umbria
Table A86. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 227.367 430.196 0 74.467 122.824
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 166.139 320.540 14.810 59.745
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 121.152 0.245 46.734
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 103.643 0 24.152
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A87. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 8.451 11.585 0 14.691 41.037
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.282 9.754 3.622 39.649
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 9.057 0.879 36.708
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.134 0 9.069
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A88. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 101.901 163.001 0 41.070 82.096
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 57.797 95.057 2.099 33.752
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 61.006 2.070 24.365
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 44.620 0 1.706
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A89. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.008 −0.000 0.008 0.042
0.006 0.004 0.032 0.033
Region of birth −0.536 −0.906∗∗∗ −0.536 −1.654
0.471 0.335 2.407 2.427
Education 1.718∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.718 2.219
0.289 0.206 1.538 1.831
Missing education −0.069∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.077∗∗
0.005 0.004 0.027 0.029
Past experience −117.600∗∗∗ −195.876∗∗∗ −117.600 −84.037
8.580 6.060 114.083 116.975
Missing past exp. 0.005 −0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.012
0.005 0.004 0.042 0.040
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.009∗ −0.003 −0.009 −0.031
0.005 0.004 0.040 0.042
Regional mobility −0.004 −0.003 −0.004 −0.011
0.006 0.004 0.036 0.033
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.008 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.006
0.006 0.004 0.061 0.054
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.004
0.003 0.002 0.009 0.009
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.002 −0.007∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
0.004 0.003 0.020 0.018
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004
0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A18. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A90. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.00939 -.01274 -.01547 -.01551 -.01548 .01366∗
.03141 .01967 .01951 .01966 .01874 .00779
Apprenticeship prob. .00903 .00908 .0089 .0089 .00832 .00893
.01372 .0136 .01349 .01347 .01346 .01324
Perm. Employment prob. .01679 .01688 .01352 .01351 .01372 .01918
.01782 .01532 .01502 .01514 .01529 .01342
Self employment .00163 .00154 .00191 .00192 .0024 -.00051
.0105 .0106 .01037 .01037 .00994 .00956
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of
recruitment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-
varying baseline characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher
than the 25th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and
year; a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the
education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s
past experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past experience distribution at a given
age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing sector; a dummy if the worker’s number
of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at
a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number of job separations higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy equal to
1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations) higher
than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job
episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted
of a labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
at a given age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of
social insurance higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given
age in a given month and year.
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A1.19. Valle d’Aosta
Table A91. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 28.658 65.313 0 35.723 104.578
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 1.827 14.750 2.969 34.809
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 7.965 0.078 10.992
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.532 0 0.178
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A92. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.590 6.313 0 1.931 26.591
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 2.068 6.448 1.380 25.629
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 5.140 0.260 20.667
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 2.974 0 3.333
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A93. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 12.700 17.320 0 18.063 39.366
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.612 13.547 2.257 30.331
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 11.847 0.134 11.667
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.039 0 0.417
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A94. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender −0.120∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.120∗ −0.055
0.013 0.009 0.061 0.065
Region of birth −1.803∗ −0.141 −1.803 −2.859
1.090 0.767 7.065 5.819
Education −1.349∗∗ −3.266∗∗∗ −1.349 −0.367
0.580 0.409 3.245 3.371
Missing education −0.050∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.050 −0.044
0.012 0.008 0.083 0.068
Past experience −58.338∗∗∗ −139.698∗∗∗ −58.338 −32.652
18.449 12.990 149.170 128.516
Missing past exp. −0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.010
0.010 0.007 0.016 0.030
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector −0.135∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
0.011 0.008 0.042 0.042
Regional mobility −0.014 0.018∗∗ −0.014 −0.033
0.012 0.009 0.067 0.047
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.058∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.058 −0.052
0.013 0.009 0.081 0.083
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows 0.008 −0.007 0.008 0.012
0.008 0.005 0.018 0.019
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.016 −0.015∗∗ −0.016 −0.003
0.010 0.007 0.010 0.014
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.003
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is
±1(2). Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if
the job episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of
interest, for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A19. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A95. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. -.02734 -.02337 -.02411 -.02395 -.01586 -.03063∗
.046 .0327 .03296 .03339 .03399 .01713
Apprenticeship prob. .00395 .00411 .00522 .00521 .00419 .00444
.01328 .01335 .0133 .01332 .01318 .01315
Perm. Employment prob. -.04089∗∗ -.04035∗∗ -.03454∗ -.0345∗ -.03708∗ -.03392∗
.01908 .01905 .01909 .0189 .01948 .01957
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruit-
ment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline
characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile
of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s
educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a
given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile
of the past experience distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing
sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number
of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age;
a dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separa-
tions) higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if
the job episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted of a
labour costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given
age in a given month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and
year.
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A1.20. Veneto
Table A96. Apprenticeship probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 602.309 1431.328 0 581.987 1180.089
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 104.167 408.888 18.490 192.984
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 188.550 0.051 166.068
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 46.773 0 18.885
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that the
functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted regression
of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J possible values
of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If the statistic
exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard error are
clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A97. Employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 4.951 18.800 0 17.114 36.749
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 0.082 2.465 11.147 17.675
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM 0 1.081 11.094 15.963
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM 0 0.245 0 12.053
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
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Table A98. Permanent employment probability.
Without DiD specification DiD Model specification
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3]
First Order Polynomial
LM 0 34.689 63.362 0 28.840 48.487
CV 6.635 11.345 15.086 11.345 18.475 24.725
Second Order Polynomial
LM 21.883 40.160 18.734 31.199
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Third Order Polynomial
LM −0.002 20.793 18.564 30.109
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Fourth Order Polynomial
LM −0.002 16.308 0 17.289
CV 11.345 15.086 18.475 24.725
Notes: The null hypothesis of the test Lagrange Multiplier, LM, is that
the functional form adopted is statistically equal to an unrestricted re-
gression of the outcome on the full set of dummy variables for the J
possible values of age which define the age range reported in brackets. If
the statistic exceeds the critical values CV , the null is rejected. Standard
error are clustered at the age and year of birth level.
Table A99. Balancing out covariates at the threshold.
Main Sample
Raw data Polynomial fit
[-1,1] [-2,2] [-1,1] [-2,2]
DiD DiD DiD DiD
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Gender 0.010∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.010 0.015
0.003 0.002 0.011 0.013
Region of birth −3.502∗∗∗ −2.321∗∗∗ −3.502∗∗∗ −3.957∗∗∗
0.208 0.147 0.990 0.997
Education 0.611∗∗∗ 0.025 0.611 0.806
0.124 0.088 0.853 0.787
Missing education −0.017∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.017 −0.022∗
0.002 0.002 0.011 0.011
Past experience −124.362∗∗∗ −240.013∗∗∗ −124.362 −88.283
4.192 2.939 140.816 142.075
Missing past exp. −0.020∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.024
0.002 0.002 0.038 0.038
Region of work 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Changing sector 0.004∗ 0.003∗ 0.004 0.007
0.002 0.002 0.014 0.012
Regional mobility −0.027∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.027∗ −0.032∗
0.003 0.002 0.014 0.016
Higher 25 per. monthly job spells −0.009∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.015
0.003 0.002 0.051 0.051
Higher 25 per. monthly sep. flows −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000
0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010
Higher 25 per. monthly net job flows −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.004
0.002 0.001 0.018 0.017
Higher 25 perc. hiring incentive 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Higher than 25 perc. costs reduction 0 0.000 0 −0.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Higher than 25 perc. soc. insurance benefits −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Notes: The polynomial fit corresponds to a first (third) order polynomial in age when the age range is ±1(2).
Each variable defined as higher than the 25th percentile is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the job
episode sits in a percentile higher than the 25th of the age specific distribution of the covariate of interest,
for instance the number of job spells in a given month and year.
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(a) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(b) Apprenticeship Probability.
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(c) Employment Probability.
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(d) Employment Probability.
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(e) Permanent Employment Probability.
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(f) Permanent Employment Probability.
Figure A20. Difference in discontinuities.
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Table A100. Static model estimates.
Working sample at the baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment prob. .00411 .00588 .00621 .0061 .00604 -.00073
.02804 .00822 .00793 .00809 .00773 .00444
Apprenticeship prob. .01324∗∗ .01324∗∗ .01321∗∗ .01321∗∗ .01316∗∗ .01268∗∗
.00603 .00585 .00581 .00581 .00571 .00562
Perm. Employment prob. .0166 .017∗ .01692∗ .0169∗ .01696∗ .01726∗
.01164 .00969 .00935 .00935 .00921 .00908
Region of birth fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effect NO NO YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effect NO NO NO YES YES YES
Time invariant covariates NO NO NO NO YES YES
Time varying covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes:Time invariant characteristics correspond to the real monthly earnings at the time of recruit-
ment, gender, a dummy for missing information on education, past experience. Time-varying baseline
characteristics include a dummy if the worker’s educational level is higher than the 25th percentile
of the education distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s
educational level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution at a given age in a
given month and year; a dummy if the worker’s past experience is higher than the 75th percentile
of the past experience distribution at a given age in a given month and year; a dummy for changing
sector; a dummy if the worker’s number of multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of
the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job episode is associated to a number
of job separations higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a
dummy equal to 1 if the job episode is associated to a number of net flows (hirings minus separations)
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age; a dummy if the job
episode benefitted of hiring incentives higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribu-
tion at a given age in a given month and year, a dummy if the job episode benefitted of a labour costs
reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given
month and year, and finally a dummy if the job episode benefitted of social insurance higher than the
25th percentile of the corresponding distribution at a given age in a given month and year.
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Appendix B1. Additional figures
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(a) Abruzzo.
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(b) Basilicata.
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(c) Trentino Alto Adige.
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(d) Calabria.
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(e) Campania.
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(f) Emilia Romagna.
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(g) Friuli Venezia Giulia.
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(h) Lazio.
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(i) Liguria.
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(j) Lombardia.
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(k) Marche.
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(l) Molise.
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(m) Piemonte.
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(n) Puglia.
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(o) Sardegna.
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(p) Sicilia.
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(q) Toscana.
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(r) Umbria.
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(s) Valle d’Aosta.
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(t) Veneto.
Figure B1. Regional distribution of workers by region of birth.
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(a) Born neighbouring regions.
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(b) Born neighbouring regions.
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(c) Born neighbouring regions.
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(d) Born outside.
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(e) Born outside.
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(f) Born outside.
Figure B2. Difference in discontinuities: differential impact across those born in neighbouring regions and
those born outside
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(a) Employment.
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(b) Apprenticeship.
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(c) Permanent employment.
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(d) Employment.
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(e) Apprenticeship.
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(f) Permanent employment.
Figure B3. Difference in discontinuities: differential impact across regional level of reading PISA test scores
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Appendix B2. The difference in discontinuity regression design.
Following Maida and Sonedda (2019) let’s define n the fraction in the population at
a given age a of those who start either working or a self-employment activity in a
given year. The residual fraction 1 − n is made of those, aged a, who have started
working in the previous year(s) and those who were unable to have a job spell (even
of one day) in the given year. Law no. 30/2003 fixed the maximum age at which an
apprenticeship labour contract can be signed at 29 years and 364 days. Consider then
an outcome y (apprenticeship, employment and permanent employment probability)
and let’s express quantities in terms of expected potential outcomes for this fraction
n in the population:
E[y1ib|ai] = µ1b
E[y0ib|ai] = µ0b
where b indicates before the introduction of law no.92/2012; 1 and 0 refer to the
left and right side of the age threshold.
That is, µ0b = α0 + β0ai and µ1b = µ0b + γ0.
Other covariates are not included for the sake of simplicity. The two sides of the
cutoff identify the treatment and control states since the intention to assignment into
treatment (i.e. job entry as apprentice) is based on the following selection rule:
di =
{
1 if ai < am
0 if ai ≥ am
where am is the age threshold level (i.e. 30).
I start from the usual definition of the observed outcome for the n fraction in the
population whose age is close to the threshold. I then take expectations under the
assumption that the intention to assignment into treatment is locally randomised (i.e.
independence assumption: y1ib ⊥ di and y0ib ⊥ di, i.e. the law could have established
another age threshold.)
yib = y1ibdi + y0ib(1− di)
E[yib|di, ai] = E[yib|ai] = E[y0ib|ai] + (E[y1ib|ai]− E[y0ib|ai])di
E[yib|ai] = µ0b + [µ1b − µ0b]di
Assume that after the introduction of law no.92/2012, for the fraction n in the
population, the potential outcomes are equal to:
E[y1ip|ai] = µ1p
E[y0ip|ai] = µ0p
where p indicates post; 1 and 0 refer to the left and right side of the age threshold.
That is, µ0post = α0 + α1 + β0ai and µ1post = µ0post + γ1.
I wrap up here the time dimension into the before (0) and post (1) categories
considering the treatment status k = 0, 1 with respect to the introduction of law no.
84
92/2012. Under the crucial hypothesis that the fraction n in the population around the
age threshold is constant across the before and after reform periods, it is possible to
identify a difference in discontinuity parameter by estimating the following regression
model:
yit = α0 + α1kit + β0ait + γ1ditkit + γ0dit + it (B4)
This parameter corresponds to: (µ11 − µ01)− (µ10 − µ00).
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